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Abstract
We settle a long-standing open question in algorithmic game theory. We prove that Bi-
matrix, the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium in a two-player game, is complete for
the complexity class PPAD (Polynomial Parity Argument, Directed version) introduced by
Papadimitriou in 1991.
This is the first of a series of results concerning the complexity of Nash equilibria. In
particular, we prove the following theorems:
• Bimatrix does not have a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme unless every
problem in PPAD is solvable in polynomial time.
• The smoothed complexity of the classic Lemke-Howson algorithm and, in fact, of any
algorithm for Bimatrix is not polynomial unless every problem in PPAD is solvable in
randomized polynomial time.
Our results demonstrate that, even in the simplest form of non-cooperative games, equilib-
rium computation and approximation are polynomial-time equivalent to fixed point compu-
tation. Our results also have two broad complexity implications in mathematical economics
and operations research:
• Arrow-Debreu market equilibria are PPAD-hard to compute.
• The P-Matrix Linear Complementary Problem is computationally harder than convex
programming unless every problem in PPAD is solvable in polynomial time.
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1 Introduction
In 1944, Morgenstern and von Neumann [43] initiated the study of game theory and its applica-
tions to economic behavior. At the center of their study was von Neumann’s minimax equilibrium
solution for two-player zero-sum games [56]. In a two-player zero-sum game, one player’s gain is
equal to the loss of the other. They observed that any general n-player (non-zero-sum) game can
be reduced to an (n + 1)-player zero-sum game. Their work went on to introduce the notion of
cooperative games and the solution concept of stable sets.
In 1950, following the original spirit of Morgenstern and von Neumann’s work on two-player
zero-sum games, Nash [45, 44] formulated a solution concept for non-cooperative games among
multiple players. In a non-cooperative game, the zero-sum condition is relaxed and no commu-
nication and coalition among players are allowed. Building on the notion of mixed strategies
of [56], the solution concept, now commonly referred to as the Nash equilibrium, captures the
notion of the individual rationality of players at an equilibrium point. In a Nash equilibrium,
each player’s strategy is a best response to other players’ strategies. Nash proved that every
n-player, finite, non-cooperative game has an equilibrium point. His original proof [45, 39] was
based on Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem [7]. David Gale suggested the use of Kakutani’s Fixed
Point Theorem [30] to simplify the proof. Mathematically, von Neumann’s Minimax Theorem
for two-player zero-sum games can be proved by linear programming duality. In contrast, the
fixed point approach to Nash’s Equilibrium Theorem seems to be necessary: even for two-player
non-cooperative games, linear programming duality is no longer applicable.
Nash’s equilibrium concept has had a tremendous influence on economics, as well as in other
social and natural science disciplines [27]. Nash’s approach to non-cooperative games has played
an essential role in shaping mathematical economics, which consider agents with competing indi-
vidual interests. A few years after Nash’s work, Arrow and Debreu [3], also applying fixed point
theorems, proved a general existence theorem for market equilibria. Since then, various forms of
equilibrium theorems have been established via fixed point theorems.
However, the existence proofs based on fixed point theorems do not usually lead to efficient
algorithms for finding equilibria. In fact, in spite of many remarkable breakthroughs in algorithmic
game theory and mathematical programming, answers to several fundamental questions about
the computation of Nash and Arrow-Debreu equilibria remain elusive. The most notable open
problem is that of deciding whether the problem of finding an equilibrium point in a two-player
game is solvable in polynomial time.
In this paper, we settle the complexity of computing a two-player Nash equilibrium and
answer two central questions regarding the approximation and smoothed complexity of this game
theoretic problem. In the next few subsections, we will review previous work on the computation
of Nash equilibria, state our main results, and discuss their extensions to the computation of
market equilibria.
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1.1 Finite-Step Equilibrium Algorithms
Since Nash and Arrow-Debreu’s pioneering work, great progress has been made in the effort to
find constructive and algorithmic proofs of equilibrium theorems. The advances for equilibrium
computation can be chronologically classified according to the following two periods:
• Finite-step period: In this period, the main objective was to design equilibrium algo-
rithms that terminate in a finite number of steps and to understand for which equilibrium
problems finite-step algorithms do not exist.
• Polynomial-time period: In this period, the main objective has been to develop polynomial-
time algorithms for computing equilibria and to characterize the complexity of equilibrium
computation.
The duality-based proof of the minimax theorem leads to a linear programming formulation
of the problem of finding an equilibrium in a two-player zero-sum game. One can apply the
simplex algorithm, in a finite number of steps in the Turing model1, to compute an equilibrium
in a two-player zero-sum game with rational payoffs. A decade or so after Nash’s seminal work,
Lemke and Howson [38] developed a path-following, simplex-like algorithm for finding a Nash
equilibrium in a general two-player game. Like the simplex algorithm, their algorithm terminates
in a finite number of steps for a two-player game with rational payoffs.
The Lemke-Howson algorithm has been extended to non-cooperative games with more than
two players [57]. However, due to Nash’s observation that there are rational three-player games
all of whose equilibria are irrational, finite-step algorithms become harder to obtain for games
with three or more players. For those multi-player games, no finite-step algorithm exists in the
classical Turing model.
Similarly, some exchange economies do not have any rational Arrow-Debreu equilibria. The
absence of a rational equilibrium underscores the continuous nature of equilibrium computation.
Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem — that any continuous map f from a convex compact body, such
as a simplex or a hypercube, to itself has a fixed point — is inherently continuous. Mathematically,
the continuous nature does not hinder the definition of search problems for finding equilibria and
fixed points. But to measure the computational complexity of these continuous problems in the
classical Turing model, some imprecision or inaccuracy must be introduced to ensure the existence
of a solution with a finite description [51, 52, 46, 26, 21]. For example, one possible definition
of an approximate fixed point of a continuous map f is a point x in the convex body such that
||f(x)− x|| ≤ ǫ for a given ǫ > 0 [51].
In 1928, Sperner [53] discovered a discrete fixed point theorem that led to one of the most
elegant proofs of the Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem. Suppose that Ω is a d-dimensional simplex
with vertices v1, v2, ..., vd+1, and that S is a simplicial decomposition of Ω. Suppose Π assigns
to each vertex of S a color from {1, 2, ..., d + 1} such that, for every vertex v of S, Π(v) 6= i
if the ith component of the barycentric coordinate of v, in terms of v1, v2, ..., vd+1, is 0. Then,
1The simplex algorithm also terminates in a finite number of steps in various computational models involving
real numbers, such as the Blum-Shub-Smale model [5].
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Sperner’s Lemma asserts that there exists a simplex cell in S that contains all colors. This
fully-colored simplex cell is often referred to as a panchromatric simplex or a Sperner simplex
of (S,Π). Consider a Brouwer map f with Lipschitz constant L over the simplex Ω. Suppose
further that the diameter of each simplex cell in S is at most ǫ/L. Then, one can define a color
assignment Πf such that each panchromatric simplex in (S,Πf ) must have a vertex v satisfying
||f(v) − v|| ≤ Θ(ǫ). Thus, a panchromatic simplex of (S,Πf ) can be viewed as an approximate,
discrete fixed point of f .
Inspired by the Lemke-Howson algorithm, Scarf developed a path-following algorithm, using
simplicial subdivision, for computing approximate fixed points [51] and competitive equilibrium
prices [52]. The path-following method has also had extensive applications to mathematical
programming and has since grown into an algorithm-design paradigm in optimization and equi-
librium analysis. One can take a similar approximation approach to study the complexity of Nash
equilibria, especially for games involving three or more players.
1.2 Computational Complexity of Nash Equilibria
Since 1960s, the theory of computation has shifted its focus from whether problems can be solved
on a computer to how efficiently problems can be solved on a computer. The field has gained
maturity with rapid advances in algorithm design, algorithm analysis, and complexity theory.
Problems are categorized into complexity classes, capturing the potential difficulty of decision,
search, and optimization problems. The complexity classes P, RP, and BPP, and their search
counterparts such as FP, have become the standard classes for characterizing computational
problems that are tractable2.
The desire to find fast and polynomial-time algorithms for computing equilibria has been
greatly enhanced with the rise of the Internet [48]. The rise has created a surge of human activi-
ties that make computation, communication and optimization of participating agents accessible
at microeconomic levels. Efficient computation is instrumental to support the basic operations,
such as pricing, in this large scale on-line market [49]. Many new game and economic problems
have been introduced, and in the meantime, classical game and economic problems have be-
come the subjects for active complexity studies [48]. Algorithmic game theory has grown into a
highly interdisciplinary field intersecting economics, mathematics, operations research, numerical
analysis, and computer science.
In 1979, Khachiyan made a ground-breaking discovery that the ellipsoid algorithm can solve
a linear program in polynomial time [34]. Shortly after, Karmarkar improved the complexity
for solving linear programming with his path-following, interior-point algorithm [32]. His work
initiated the implementation of theoretically-sound linear programming algorithms. Motivated
by a grand challenge in Theory of Computing [16], Spielman and Teng [54] introduced a new al-
gorithm analysis framework, smoothed analysis, based on perturbation theory, to provide rigorous
complexity-theoretic justification for the good practical performance of the simplex algorithm.
2
FP stands for Function Polynomial-Time. In this paper, as we only consider search problems, without further
notice, we will (ab)use P and RP to denote the classes of search problems that can be solved in polynomial time
or in randomized polynomial-time, respectively. We believe doing so will help more general readers.
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They proved that although almost all known simplex algorithms have exponential worst-case
complexity [35], the smoothed complexity of the simplex algorithm with the shadow-vertex piv-
oting rule is polynomial. As a result of these developments in linear programming, equilibrium
solutions of two-player zero-sum games can be found in polynomial time using the ellipsoid or
interior-point algorithms and in smoothed polynomial time using the simplex algorithm.
However, no polynomial-time algorithm has been found for computing discrete fixed points
or approximate fixed points, rendering the equilibrium proofs based on fixed point theorems
non-constructive in the view of polynomial-time computability.
The difficulty of discrete fixed point computation is partially justified in the query model. In
1989, Hirsch, Papadimitriou, and Vavasis [26] proved an exponential lower bound on the number
of function evaluations necessary to find a discrete fixed point, even in two dimensions, assuming
algorithms only have a black-box access to the fixed point function. Their bound has recently
been improved [8] and extended to the randomized query model [13] and to the quantum query
model [23, 13].
Motivated by the pivoting structure used in the Lemke-Howson algorithm, Papadimitriou
introduced the complexity class PPAD [46]. PPAD is an abbreviation for Polynomial Parity
Argument in a Directed graph. He introduced several search problems concerning the computation
of discrete fixed points. For example, he defined the problem Sperner to be the search problem
of finding a Sperner simplex given a polynomial-sized circuit for assigning colors to a particular
simplicial decomposition of a hypercube. Extending the model of [26], he also defined a search
problem for computing approximate Brouwer fixed points. He proved that even in three dimen-
sions, these fixed point problems are complete for the PPAD class. Recently, Chen and Deng [9]
proved that the problem of finding a discrete fixed point in two dimensions is also complete for
PPAD.
In [46], Papadimitriou also proved that Bimatrix, the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium
in a two-player game with rational payoffs is member of PPAD. His proof can be extended to
show that finding a (properly defined) approximate equilibrium in a non-cooperative game among
three or more players is also in PPAD. Thus, if these problems are PPAD-complete, then the
problem of finding an equilibrium is polynomial-time equivalent to the search problem for finding
a discrete fixed point.
It is conceivable that Nash equilibria might be easier to compute than discrete fixed points. In
fact, by taking advantage of the special structure of Nash’s normal form games, Lipton, Markarkis,
and Mehta [40] developed a sub-exponential time algorithm for finding an approximate Nash
equilibrium. In their notion of an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium, for a positive parameter ǫ,
each players’ strategy is at most an additive ǫ worse than the best response to other players’
strategies. They proved that if all payoffs are in [0, 1], then an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium
can be found in nO(logn/ǫ
2) time.
In a complexity-theoretic breakthrough, Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou [18] proved
that the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium in a game among four or more players is
complete for PPAD. To cope with the fact that equilibria may not be rational, they considered an
approximation version of equilibria by allowing exponentially small errors. The complexity result
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was soon extended to the three-player game independently by Chen and Deng [10] and Daskalakis
and Papadimitriou [20], with different proofs. The reduction of [18] has two steps: First, it
reduces a PPAD-complete discrete fixed point problem, named 3-Dimensional Brouwer, to
the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium in a degree-three graphical game [33]. Then, it reduces
the graphical game to a four-player game, using a result of Goldberg and Papadimitriou [25].
This reduction cleverly encodes fixed points by Nash equilibria.
The results of [18, 10, 20] characterize the complexity of computing k-player Nash equilibria for
k ≥ 3. They also show that the fixed point approach is necessary in proving Nash’s Equilibrium
Theorem, at least for games among three or more players. However, these latest complexity
advances on the three/four-player games have fallen short on the two-player game.
1.3 Computing Two-Player Nash Equilibria and Smoothed Complexity
There have been amazing parallels between discoveries concerning the two-player zero-sum game
and the general two-player game. First, von Neumann proved the existence of an equilibrium for
the zero-sum game, then Nash did the same for the general game. Both classes of games have
rational equilibria when payoffs are rational. Second, more than a decade after von Neumann’s
Minimax Theorem, Dantzig developed the simplex algorithm, which can find a solution of a two-
player zero-sum game in a finite number of steps. A decade or so after Nash’s work, Lemke and
Howson developed their finite-step algorithm for Bimatrix. Then, about a quarter century after
their respective developments, both the simplex algorithm [35] and the Lemke-Howson algorithm
[50] were shown to have exponential worst-case complexity.
A half century after von Neumann’s Minimax Theorem, Khachiyan proved that the ellipsoid
algorithm can solve a linear program and hence can find a solution of a two-player zero-sum
game with rational payoffs in polynomial time. Shortly after that, Borgwardt [6] showed that
the simplex algorithm has polynomial average-case complexity. Then, Spielman and Teng [54]
proved that the smoothed complexity of the simplex algorithm is polynomial. If history is of any
guide, then a half century after Nash’s Equilibrium Theorem, one should be quite optimistic to
prove the following two natural conjectures.
• Polynomial 2-Nash Conjecture: There exists a (weakly) polynomial-time algorithm for
Bimatrix.
• Smoothed Lemke-Howson Conjecture: The smoothed complexity of the Lemke-Howson al-
gorithm for Bimatrix is polynomial.
An upbeat attitude toward the first conjecture has been encouraged by the following two
facts. First, unlike three-player games, every rational bimatrix game has a rational equilibrium.
Second, a key technical step involving coloring the graphical games in the PPAD-hardness proofs
for three/four-player games fails to extend to two-player games [18, 10, 20]. The Smoothed Lemke-
Howson Conjecture was asked by a number of people [1]. Indeed, whether the smoothed analysis
of the simplex algorithm can be extended to the Lemke-Howson algorithm [38] has been the
question most frequently raised during talks on smoothed analysis. The conjecture is a special
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case of the following conjecture posted by Spielman and Teng [55] in a survey of smoothed analysis
of algorithms.
• Smoothed 2-Nash Conjecture: The smoothed complexity of Bimatrix is polynomial.
The Smoothed 2-Nash Conjecture was inspired by the result of Ba´ra´ny, Vempala and Vetta
[4] that an equilibrium of a random two-player game can be found in polynomial time.
1.4 Our Contributions
Despite much effort in the last half century, no significant progress has been made in characterizing
the algorithmic complexity of finding a Nash equilibrium in a two-player game. Thus, Bimatrix,
the most studied computational problem about Nash equilibria, stood out as the last open problem
in equilibrium computation for normal form games. Papadimitriou [48] named it, along with
Factoring, as one of the two “most concrete open problems” at the boundary of P. In fact,
ever since Khachiyan’s discovery [34], Bimatrix has been on the frontier of natural problems
possibly solvable in polynomial time. Now, it is also on the frontier of the hard problems,
assuming PPAD is not contained in P.
In this paper, we settle the computational complexity of the two-player Nash equilibrium. We
prove:
Theorem 1.1. Bimatrix is PPAD-complete.
Our result demonstrates that, even in this simplest form of non-cooperative games, equilibrium
computation is polynomial-time equivalent to discrete fixed point computation. In particular,
we show that from each discrete Brouwer function f , we can build a two-player game G and
a polynomial-time map Π from the Nash equilibria of G to the fixed points of f . Our proof
complements Nash’s proof that for each two-player game G, there is a Brouwer function f and a
map Φ from the fixed points of f to the equilibrium points of G.
The success in proving the PPAD completeness of Bimatrix inspires us to attempt to dis-
prove the Smoothed 2-Nash Conjecture. A connection between the smoothed complexity and
approximation complexity of Nash equilibria ([55], Proposition 9.12) then leads us to prove the
following result.
Theorem 1.2. For any c > 0, the problem of computing an n−c-approximate Nash equilibrium
of a two-player game is PPAD-complete.
This result enables us to establish the following fundamental theorem about the approximation
of Nash equilibria. It also enables us answer the question about the smoothed complexity of the
Lemke-Howson algorithm and disprove the Smoothed 2-Nash Conjecture assuming PPAD is
not contained in RP.
Theorem 1.3. Bimatrix does not have a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme unless
PPAD is contained in P.
Theorem 1.4. Bimatrix is not in smoothed polynomial time unless PPAD is contained in
RP.
Consequently, it is unlikely that the nO(logn/ǫ
2)-time algorithm of Lipton, Markakis, and Mehta
[40], the fastest algorithm known today for finding an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium, can be
improved to poly(n, 1/ǫ). Also, it is unlikely that the average-case polynomial time result of [4]
can be extended to the smoothed model.
Our advances in the computation, approximation, and smoothed analysis of two-player Nash
equilibria are built on several novel techniques that might be interesting on their own. We intro-
duce a new method for encoding boolean and arithmetic variables using the probability vectors
of the mixed strategies. We then develop a set of perturbation techniques to simulate the boolean
and arithmetic operations needed for fixed point computation using the equilibrium conditions of
two-player games. These innovations enable us to bypass the graphical game model and derive
a direct reduction from fixed point computation to Bimatrix. To study the approximation and
smoothed complexity of the equilibrium problem, we introduce a new discrete fixed point problem
on a high-dimensional grid graph with a constant side-length. We then show that it can host
the embedding of the proof structure of any PPAD problem. This embedding result not only
enriches the family of PPAD-complete discrete fixed point problems, but also provides a much
needed trade-off between precision and dimension. We prove a key geometric lemma for finding a
high-dimensional discrete fixed point, a new concept defined on a simplex inside a unit hypercube.
This geometric lemma enables us to overcome the curse of dimensionality in reasoning about fixed
points in high dimensions.
1.5 Implications and Impact
Because the two-player Nash equilibrium enjoys several structural properties that Nash equilibria
with three or more players do not have, our result enables us to answer some other long-standing
open questions in mathematical economics and operations research. In particular, we have derived
the following two important corollaries.
Corollary 1.5. Arrow-Debreu market equilibria are PPAD-hard to compute.
Corollary 1.6. The P-matrix Linear Complementary Problem is computationally harder than
convex programming, unless PPAD is contained in P, where a P-matrix is a square matrix with
positive principle minors.
To prove the first corollary, we use a recent discovery of Ye [58] (see also [15]) on the connection
between two-player Nash equilibria and Arrow-Debreu equilibria in two-group Leontief exchange
economies. The second corollary concerns the linear complementary problem, in which we are
given a rational n-by-n matrix M and a rational n-place vector q, and are asked to find vectors
x and y such that y = Mx + q, x,y ≥ 0, and xTy = 0. Our result complements Megiddo’s
observation [41] that if it isNP-hard to solve the P-Matrix linear complementarity problem, then
NP = coNP.
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By applying a recent reduction of Abbott, Kane, and Valiant [2], our result also implies the
following corollary.
Corollary 1.7. Win-Lose Bimatrix is PPAD-complete, where, in a win-lose bimatrix game,
each payoff entry is either 0 or 1.
We further refine our reduction to show that the Nash equilibria in sparse two-player games
are hard to compute and hard to approximate in fully polynomial time.
We have also discovered several new structural properties about Nash equilibria. In particular,
we prove an equivalence result about various notions of approximate Nash equilibria. We exploit
these equivalences in the study of the complexity of finding an approximate Nash equilibrium
and in the smoothed analysis of Bimatrix. Using them, we can also extend our result about
approximate Nash equilibria as follows.
Theorem 1.8. For any c > 0, the problem of finding the first (1 + c) log n bits of an exact Nash
equilibrium in a two-player game, even when the payoffs are integers of polynomial magnitude, is
polynomial-time equivalent to Bimatrix.
Recently, Chen, Teng, and Valiant [14] extended our approximation complexity result to
win-lose two-player games; Huang and Teng [28] extended both the smoothed complexity and
the approximation results to the computation of Arrow-Debreu equilibria. Using the connection
between Nash equilibria and Arrow-Debreu equilibria, our complexity result on sparse games can
be extended to market equilibria in economies with sparse exchange structures [12].
1.6 Paper Organization
In Section 2, we review concepts in equilibrium theory. We also prove an important equivalence
between various notions of approximate Nash equilibria. In Section 3, we recall the complexity
class PPAD, the smoothed analysis framework, and the concept of polynomial-time reduction
among search problems. In Section 4, we introduce two concepts: high-dimensional discrete
Brouwer fixed points and generalized circuits, followed by the definitions of two search problems
based on these concepts. In Section 5, we state our main results and also provide an outline
of our proofs. In Section 6, we show that one can simulate generalized circuits with two-player
Nash equilibria. In Section 7, we prove a PPAD-completeness result for a large family of high-
dimensional fixed point search problems. In Section 8, we complete our proof by showing that
discrete fixed points can be modeled by generalized circuits. In Section 9, we discuss some
extensions of our work and present several open questions and conjectures motivated by this
research. In particular, we will show that sparse Bimatrix does not have a fully polynomial-time
approximation scheme unless PPAD is contained in P. Finally, in Section 10, we thank many
wonderful people who helped us in this work.
This paper combines the papers “Settling the Complexity of 2-Player Nash-Equilibrium”, by
Xi Chen and Xiaotie Deng, and “Computing Nash Equilibria: Approximation and Smoothed
Complexity”, by the three of us. The extended abstracts of both papers appeared in the Pro-
ceedings of the 47th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, IEEE. The result
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that Bimatrix is PPAD-complete is from the first paper. We also include the main result from
the paper “Sparse Games are Hard”, by the three of us, presented at the the 2nd International
Workshop on Internet and Network Economics.
1.7 Notation
We will use bold lower-case Roman letters such as x, a, bj to denote vectors. Whenever a vector,
say a ∈ Rn is present, its components will be denoted by lower-case Roman letters with subscripts,
such as a1, ..., an. Matrices are denoted by bold upper-case Roman letters such as A and scalars
are usually denoted by lower-case roman letters, but sometimes by upper-case Roman letters such
as M , N , and K. The (i, j)th entry of a matrix A is denoted by ai,j. Depending on the context,
we may use ai to denote the i
th row or the ith column of A.
We now enumerate some other notations that are used in this paper. We will let Zd+ to denote
the set of d-dimensional vectors with positive integer entries; 〈a|b〉 to denote the dot-product of
two vectors in the same dimension; ei to denote the unit vector whose i
th entry is equal to 1 and
all other entries are 0. Finally, for a, b ∈ R, by a = b± ǫ, we mean b− ǫ ≤ a ≤ b+ ǫ.
2 Two-Player Nash Equilibria
A two-player game [45, 37, 38] is a non-cooperative game between two players. When the first
player has m choices of actions and the second player has n choices of actions, the game, in
its normal form, can be specified by two m × n matrices A = (ai,j) and B = (bi,j). If the
first player chooses action i and the second player chooses action j, then their payoffs are ai,j
and bi,j, respectively. Thus, a two-player game is also often referred to as a bimatrix game. A
mixed strategy of a player is a probability distribution over its choices. The Nash’s Equilibrium
Theorem [45, 44], when specialized to bimatrix games, asserts that every two-player game has
an equilibrium point, i.e., a profile of mixed strategies, such that neither player can gain by
changing his or her strategy unilaterally. The zero-sum two-player game [43] is a special case of
the bimatrix game that satisfies B = −A.
Let Pn denote the set of all probability vectors in Rn, i.e., non-negative, n-place vectors whose
entries sum to 1. Then, a profile of mixed strategies can be expressed by two column vectors
(x∗ ∈ Pm,y∗ ∈ Pn).
Mathematically, a Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game (A,B) is a pair (x∗ ∈ Pm,y∗ ∈ Pn)
such that
(x∗)TAy∗ ≥ xTAy∗ and (x∗)TBy∗ ≥ (x∗)TBy, for all x ∈ Pm and y ∈ Pn.
Computationally, one might settle with an approximate Nash equilibrium. There are several
versions of approximate equilibrium points that have been defined in the literature. The following
are two most popular ones.
For a positive parameter ǫ, an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game (A,B) is
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a pair (x∗ ∈ Pm,y∗ ∈ Pn) such that
(x∗)TAy∗ ≥ xTAy∗ − ǫ and (x∗)TBy∗ ≥ (x∗)TBy − ǫ, for all x ∈ Pm and y ∈ Pn.
An ǫ-relatively-approximate Nash equilibrium of (A,B) is a pair (x∗,y∗) such that
(x∗)TAy∗ ≥ (1− ǫ)xTAy∗ and (x∗)TBy∗ ≥ (1− ǫ)(x∗)TBy, for all x ∈ Pm and y ∈ Pn.
Nash equilibria of a bimatrix game (A,B) are invariant under positive scalings, meaning, the
bimatrix game (c1A, c2B) has the same set of Nash equilibria as (A,B), as long as c1, c2 > 0. They
are also invariant under shifting: For any constants c1 and c2, the bimatrix game (c1+A, c2+B)
has the same set of Nash equilibria as (A,B). It is easy to verify that ǫ-approximate Nash
equilibria are also invariant under shifting. However, each ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium (x,y)
of (A,B) becomes a (c ·ǫ)-approximate Nash equilibrium of the bimatrix game (cA, cB) for c > 0.
Meanwhile, ǫ-relatively-approximate Nash equilibria are invariant under positive scaling, but may
not be invariant under shifting.
The notion of the ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium is defined in the additive fashion. To study
its complexity, it is important to consider bimatrix games with normalized matrices in which
the absolute value of each entry is bounded, for example, by 1. Earlier work on this subject
by Lipton, Markakis, and Mehta [40] used a similar normalization. Let Rm×n[a:b] denote the set of
m× n matrices with real entries between a and b. In this paper, we say a bimatrix game (A,B)
is normalized if A,B ∈ Rm×n[−1,1] and is positively normalized if A,B ∈ Rm×n[0,1] .
Proposition 2.1. In a normalized two-player game (A,B), every ǫ-relatively-approximate Nash
equilibrium is also an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium.
To define our main search problems of computing and approximating a two-player Nash
equilibrium, we need to first define the input models. The most general input model is the
real model in which a bimatrix game is specified by two real matrices (A,B). In the rational
model, each entry of the payoff matrices is given by the ratio of two integers. The input size
is then the total number of bits describing the payoff matrices. Clearly, by multiplying the
common denominators in a payoff matrix and using the fact that two-player Nash equilibria
are invariant under positive scaling, we can transform a rational bimatrix game into an integer
bimatrix game. Moreover, the total number of bits in this game with integer payoffs is within
a factor of poly(m,n) of the input size of its rational counterpart. In fact, Abbott, Kane, and
Valiant [2] go one step further to show that from every bimatrix game with integer payoffs, one
can construct a “homomorphic” bimatrix game with 0-1 payoffs who size is within a polynomial
factor of the input size of the original game.
It is well known that each rational bimatrix game has a rational Nash equilibrium. We may
verify this fact as following. Suppose (A,B) is a rational two-player game and (u,v) is one of its
Nash equilibria. Let row-support = {i | ui > 0} and column-support = {i | vi > 0}. Let ai and
bj denote the i
th row of A and the jth column of B, respectively. Then, by the condition of the
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Nash equilibrium, (u,v) is a feasible solution to the following linear program:
∑
i xi = 1 and
∑
i yi = 1
xi = 0, ∀i 6∈ row-support
yi = 0, ∀i 6∈ column-support
xi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ row-support
yi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ column-support
aiy = ajy, ∀i, j ∈ row-support
xTbi = x
Tbj, ∀i, j ∈ column-support
aiy ≤ ajy, ∀i 6∈ row-support, j ∈ row-support
xTbi ≤ xTbj, ∀i 6∈ column-support, j ∈ column-support.
In fact, any solution to this linear program is a Nash equilibrium of (A,B). Therefore, (A,B)
has at least one rational equilibrium point such that the total number of bits describing this
equilibrium is within a polynomial factor of the input size of (A,B). By enumerating all possible
row supports and column supports and applying the linear program above, we can find a Nash
equilibrium in the bimatrix game (A,B). This exhaustive-search algorithms takes 2m+npoly(L)
time where L is the input size of the game, and m and n are, respectively, the number of rows
and the number of columns.
In this paper, we use Bimatrix to denote the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium in a
rational bimatrix game. Without loss of generality, we make two assumptions about our search
problem: all input bimatrix games are positively normalized in which both players have the same
number of choices of actions. Thus, two important parameters associated with each instance to
Bimatrix are: n, the number of actions, and L, the total number of bits in the description of
the game. Thus, Bimatrix is in P if there exists an algorithm for Bimatrix with running time
poly(n,L). As a matter of fact, for the two-player games that we will design in our complexity
studies, L is bounded by a polynomial in n.
We also consider two families of approximation problems for two-player Nash equilibria. For
a positive constant c,
• let Expc-Bimatrix denote the following search problem: Given a rational and positively
normalized bimatrix game (A,B), compute a 2−cn-approximate Nash equilibrium of (A,B),
if A and B are n× n matrices;
• let Polyc-Bimatrix denote the following search problem: Given a rational and positively
normalized bimatrix game (A,B), compute an n−c-approximate Nash equilibrium of (A,B),
if A and B are n× n matrices.
In our analysis, we will use an alternative notion of approximate Nash equilibria as introduced
in [18], originally called ǫ-Nash equilibria. In order to avoid confusion with more commonly
used ǫ-approximate Nash equilibria, we will refer to this alternative approximation as the ǫ-well-
supported Nash equilibrium. For a bimatrix game (A,B), let ai and bj denote the i
th row of A
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and the jth column of B, respectively. In a profile of mixed strategies (x,y), the expected payoff
of the first player when choosing the ith row is aiy, and the expected payoff of the second player
when choosing the ith column is xTbi.
For a positive parameter ǫ, a pair of strategies (x∗ ∈ Pn,y∗ ∈ Pn) is an ǫ-well-supported Nash
equilibrium of (A,B) if for all j and k,
(x∗)Tbj > (x
∗)Tbk + ǫ ⇒ y∗k = 0 and ajy∗ > aky∗ + ǫ ⇒ x∗k = 0.
A Nash equilibrium is a 0-well-supported Nash equilibrium as well as a 0-approximate Nash equi-
librium. The following lemma, a key lemma in our complexity study of equilibrium approxima-
tion, shows that approximate Nash equilibria and well-supported Nash equilibria are polynomially
related. This polynomial relation allows us to focus our attention on pair-wise approximation
conditions. Thus, we can locally argue certain properties of the bimatrix game in our analysis.
Lemma 2.2 (Polynomial Equivalence). In a bimatrix game (A,B) with A,B ∈ Rn×n[0:1] , for any
0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1,
1. each ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium is also an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium; and
2. from any ǫ2/8-approximate Nash equilibrium (u,v), one can find in polynomial time an
ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium (x,y).
Proof. The first statement follows from the definitions. Because (u,v) is an ǫ2/8-approximate
Nash equilibrium, we have
∀ u′ ∈ Pn, (u′)TAv ≤ uTAv + ǫ2/8, and ∀ v′ ∈ Pn, uTBv′ ≤ uTBv + ǫ2/8.
Recall that ai denotes the i
th row of A and bi denotes the i
th column of B. We use J1 to denote
the set of indices j : 1 ≤ j ≤ n such that aiv ≥ ajv + ǫ/2, for some i ∈ [1 : n]. Let i∗ be
an index such that ai∗v = max1≤i≤n aiv. Now by changing uj, j ∈ J1, to 0 and changing ui∗
to ui∗ +
∑
j∈J1
uj we can increase the first-player’s profit by at least (ǫ/2)
∑
j∈J1
uj , implying∑
j∈J1
uj < ǫ/4. Similarly, we define J2 = { j : 1 ≤ j ≤ n : ∃ i, uTbi ≥ uTbj + ǫ/2}. Then we
have
∑
j∈J2
vj < ǫ/4.
We now set all these {uj | j ∈ J1} and {vj | j ∈ J2} to zero, and uniformly increase the
probabilities of other strategies to obtain a new pair of mixed strategies (x,y).
Note for all i ∈ [1 : n], |aiy − aiv | ≤ ǫ/4, because we assume the value of each entry in ai
is between 0 and 1. Therefore, for every pair i, j : 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, the relative change between
aiy − ajy and aiv − ajv is no more than ǫ/2. Thus, any j that is beaten by some i by a gap of
ǫ is already set to zero in (x,y).
We conclude this section by pointing out that there are other natural notions of approximation
for equilibrium points. In addition to the rational representation of a rational equilibrium, one can
use binary representations to define entries in an equilibrium. As each entry p in an equilibrium
is a number between 0 and 1, we can specify it using its binary representation (0.c1 · · · cP · · · ),
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where ci ∈ {0, 1} and p = limi→∞
∑
i=1 ci/2
i. Some rational numbers may not have a finite binary
representation. Usually, we round off the numbers to store their finite approximations. The first
P bits c1, ..., cP give us a P -bit approximation c˜ of c.
For a positive integer P , we will use P -Bit-Bimatrix to denote the search problem of com-
puting the first P bits of the entries of a Nash equilibrium in a rational bimatrix game. The
following proposition relates P -Bit-Bimatrix with Polyc-Bimatrix.
Proposition 2.3. Suppose (x,y) is a Nash equilibrium of a positively normalized two-player game
(A,B) with n rows and n columns. For a positive integer P , let (x˜, y˜) be the P -bit approximation
of (x,y). Let x¯ = x˜/ ‖x˜‖1 and y¯ = y˜/ ‖y˜‖1. Then, (x¯, y¯) is a (3n2−P )-approximate Nash
equilibrium of (A,B).
Proof. A similar proposition is stated and proved in [14].
Let a = 2−P . Suppose (x¯, y¯) is not a (3na)-approximate Nash equilibrium. Without loss of
generality, assume there exists x′ ∈ Pn such that (x′)TAy¯ > x¯TAy¯+ 3na. We have
(x′)TAy¯ ≤ (x′)TAy˜ + na ≤ (x′)TAy + na ≤ xTAy + na
≤ x˜TAy + 2na ≤ x˜TAy˜ + 3na ≤ x¯TAy˜ + 3na ≤ x¯TAy¯ + 3na,
which contradicts our assumption. To see the first inequality, note that since the game is positively
normalized, every component in (x′)TA is between 0 and 1. The inequality follows from the fact
that y¯i ≥ y˜i for all i ∈ [1 : n], and ‖y˜‖1 ≥ 1 − na. The other inequalities can be proved
similarly.
3 Complexity and Algorithm Analysis
In this section, we review the complexity class PPAD and the concept of polynomial-time reduc-
tion among search problems. We then define the perturbation models in the smoothed analysis
of Bimatrix and show that if the smoothed complexity of Bimatrix is polynomial, then we can
compute an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game in randomized poly(n, 1/ǫ) time.
3.1 PPAD and Polynomial-Time Reduction Among Search Problems
A binary relation R ⊂ {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ is polynomially balanced if there exist constants c and k
such that for all pairs (x, y) ∈ R, |y | ≤ c |x |k, where |x | denotes the length of string x. It is
polynomial-time computable if for each pair (x, y), one can decide whether or not (x, y) ∈ R in
time polynomial in |x | + |y |. One can define the NP search problem SearchR specified by R
as: Given x ∈ {0, 1}∗, return a y such satisfying (x, y) ∈ R, if such y exists, otherwise, return a
special string “no”.
A relation R is total if for every string x ∈ {0, 1}∗, there exists y such that (x, y) ∈ R.
Following Megiddo and Papadimitriou [42], let TFNP denote the class of all NP search problems
specified by total relations. A search problem SearchR1 ∈ TFNP is polynomial-time reducible
to problem SearchR2 ∈ TFNP if there exists a pair of polynomial-time computable functions
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(f, g) such that for every x of R1, if y satisfies that (f(x), y) ∈ R2, then (x, g(y)) ∈ R1. Search
problems SearchR1 and SearchR2 are polynomial-time equivalent if SearchR2 is also reducible
to SearchR1.
The complexity class PPAD [47] is a sub-class of TFNP, containing all search problems
polynomial-time reducible to following problem called End-of-Line:
Definition 3.1 (End-of-Line). The input instance of End-of-Line is a pair (M, 0n) where
M is a circuit of size polynomial in n that defines a function M satisfying:
• for every v ∈ {0, 1}n, M(v) is an ordered pair (u1, u2) where u1, u2 ∈ {0, 1}n ∪ {“no”}.
• M(0n) = (“no”, 1n) and the first component of M(1n) is 0n.
This instance defines a directed graph GM = (V,EM ) with V = {0, 1}n and (u, v) ∈ EM , if
and only if v is the second component of M(u) and u is the first component of M(v).
The output of this problem is an end vertex GM other than 0
n, where a vertex of V is an end
vertex if the summation of its in-degree and out-degree is equal to one.
Note that in graph GM , both the in-degree and the out-degree of each vertex are at most
1. Thus, edges of GM form a collection of directed paths and directed cycles. Because 0
n has
in-degree 0 and out-degree 1, it is an end vertex in GM . GM must have at least one directed
path. Hence, it has another end vertex and End-of-Line is a member of TFNP.
In fact, GM has an odd number of end vertices other than 0
n. By evaluating the polynomial-
sized circuit M on an input v ∈ V , we can access the predecessor and the successor of v.
Many important problems, such as the search versions of Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem,
Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem, Smith’s Theorem, and Borsuk-Ulam Theorem, have been shown
to be in the class PPAD [46].
Bimatrix is also in PPAD [46]. As a corollary, for all c > 0, Polyc-Bimatrix and Expc-
Bimatrix are in PPAD. However, it is not clear whether P -Bit-Bimatrix, for a positive integer
P , is in PPAD.
3.2 Smoothed Models of Bimatrix Games
In the smoothed analysis of the bimatrix game, we consider perturbed games in which each entry
of the payoff matrices is subject to a small and independent random perturbation. For a pair of
n×n normalized matrices A = (ai,j) and B = (bi,j), in the smoothed model, the input instance3
is then defined by (A,B) where ai,j and bi,j are, respectively, independent perturbations of a¯i,j
and b¯i,j with magnitude σ.
3 For the simplicity of presentation, in this subsection, we model the entries of payoff matrices and perturbations
by real numbers. Of course, to connect with the complexity result of the previous section, where entries of matrices
are in finite representations, we are mindful that some readers may prefer that we state our result and write the
proof more explicitly using the finite representations. Using Equations (16) and (17) in the proof of Lemma 3.2
(see Appendix A), we can define a discrete version of the uniform and Gaussian perturbations and state and prove
the same result.
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There might be several models of perturbations for ai,j and bi,j with magnitude σ [55]. The
two common perturbation models are the uniform perturbation and the Gaussian perturbation.
In the uniform perturbation with magnitude σ, ai,j and bi,j are chosen uniformly from the
intervals [a¯i,j − σ, a¯i,j + σ] and [b¯i,j − σ, b¯i,j + σ], respectively. In the Gaussian perturbation with
variance σ2, ai,j and bi,j are, respectively, chosen with density
1√
2πσ
e−|ai,j−a¯i,j |
2/2σ2 and
1√
2πσ
e−|bi,j−b¯i,j |
2/2σ2 .
We refer to these perturbations as σ-uniform and σ-Gaussian perturbations, respectively.
The smoothed complexity of an algorithm J for Bimatrix is defined as following: Let
TJ(A,B) be the complexity of J for finding a Nash equilibrium in a bimatrix game (A,B).
Then, the smoothed complexity of J under perturbations Nσ() of magnitude σ is
SmoothedJ [n, σ] = max
A¯,B¯∈Rn×n
[−1,1]
EA←Nσ(A¯),B←Nσ(B¯) [TJ (A,B)] ,
where we use A← Nσ(A¯) to denote that A is a perturbation of A¯ according to Nσ(A¯).
An algorithm J has a polynomial smoothed time complexity [55] if for all 0 < σ < 1 and for
all positive integer n, there exist positive constants c, k1 and k2 such that
SmoothedJ [n, σ] ≤ c · nk1σ−k2 .
Bimatrix is in smoothed polynomial time if there exists an algorithm J with polynomial smoothed
time complexity for computing a two-player Nash equilibrium.
The following lemma shows that if the smoothed complexity of Bimatrix is low, under
uniform or Gaussian perturbations, then one can quickly find an approximate Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 3.2 (Smoothed Nash vs Approximate Nash). If Bimatrix is in smoothed polynomial
time under uniform or Gaussian perturbations, then for all ǫ > 0, there exists a randomized
algorithm to compute an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium in a two-player game with expected time
O
(
poly(m,n, 1/ǫ)
)
or O
(
poly(m,n,
√
log max(m,n)/ǫ)
)
, respectively.
Proof. Informally argued in [55]. See Appendix A for a proof.
4 Two Search Problems
In this section, we consider two search problems that are essential to our main results. In the
first problem, the objective is to find a high-dimensional discrete Brouwer fixed point. To define
the second problem, we introduce a concept of the generalized circuit.
4.1 Discrete Brouwer Fixed Points
The following is an oblivious fact: Suppose we color the endpoints of an interval [0, n] by two
distinct colors, say red and blue, insert n− 1 points evenly into this interval to subdivide it into
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n unit subintervals, and color these new points arbitrarily by one of the two colors. Then, there
must be a bichromatic subinterval, i.e., an unit subinterval whose two endpoints have distinct
colors.
Our first search problem is built on a high-dimensional extension of this fact. Instead of
coloring points in a subdivision of an intervals, we color the vertices in a hypergrid. If the
dimension is d, we will use d+ 1 colors.
For d ∈ Z1+ and r in Zd+, let Adr = {q ∈ Zd
∣∣ 0 ≤ qi ≤ ri − 1,∀ i ∈ [1 : d]} denote the vertices
of the hypergrid with side lengths specified by r. The boundary of Adr, ∂(A
d
r), is the set of points
q ∈ Adr with qi ∈ {0, ri − 1} for some i. Let Size [r] =
∑
1≤i≤d ⌈ log(ri + 1) ⌉.
In one dimension, the interval [0, n] is the union of n unit subintervals. A hypergrid can be
viewed as the union of a collection of unit hypercubes. For a point p ∈ Zd, let Kp = {q ∈
Z
d
∣∣ qi ∈ {pi, pi + 1} ,∀ i ∈ [1 : d]} be the vertices of the unit hypercube with p as its corner
closest to the origin.
We can color the vertices of a hypergrid with (d + 1) colors {1, 2, ..., d + 1}. Like in one
dimension, the coloring of the boundary vertices needs to meet certain requirements in the context
of the discrete Brouwer fixed point problem. A color assignment φ of Adr is valid if φ(p) satisfies
the following condition: For p ∈ ∂(Adr), if there exists an i ∈ [1 : d] such that pi = 0 then
φ(p) = max{ i ∣∣ pi = 0}; otherwise φ(p) = d+1. In the later case, ∀ i, pi 6= 0 and ∃i, pi = ri− 1.
The following theorem is a high-dimensional extension of the one-dimensional fact mentioned
above. It is also an extension of the two-dimensional Sperner’s Lemma.
Theorem 4.1 (High-Dimensional Discrete Brouwer Fixed Points). For d ∈ Z1+ and r in Zd+, for
any valid coloring φ of Adp, there is a unit hypercube in A
d
p whose vertices have all d+ 1 colors.
In other words, Theorem 4.1 asserts that there exists a p ∈ Adr such that φ assigns all (d+1)
colors to Kp. We call Kp a panchromatic cube. However, in d-dimensions, a panchromatic cube
contains 2d vertices. This exponential dependency in the dimension makes it inefficient to check
whether a hypercube is panchromatic. We introduce the following notion of discrete fixed points.
Definition 4.2 (Panchromatic Simplex). A subset P ⊂ Adr is accommodated if P ⊂ Kp for some
point p ∈ Adr. P ⊂ Adr is a panchromatic simplex of a color assignment φ if it is accommodated
and contains exactly d+ 1 points with d+ 1 distinct colors.
Corollary 4.3 (Existence of Panchromatic Simplex). For d ∈ Z1+ and r in Zd+, for any valid
coloring φ of Adp, there exists a panchromatic simplex in A
d
p.
We can define a search problem based on Theorem 4.1, or precisely, based on Corollary 4.3.
An input instance is a hypergrid together with a polynomial-sized circuit for coloring the vertices
of the hypergrid.
Definition 4.4 (Brouwer-Mapping Circuit and Color Assignment). For d ∈ Z1+ and r ∈ Zd+,
a Boolean circuit C with Size [r] input bits and 2d output bits ∆+1 ,∆
−
1 , ...,∆
+
d ,∆
−
d is a valid
Brouwer-mapping circuit (with parameters d and r) if the following is true.
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• For every p ∈ Adr, the 2d output bits of C evaluated at p satisfy one of the following (d+1)
cases:
– Case i, 1 ≤ i ≤ d: ∆+i = 1 and all other 2d− 1 bits are 0;
– Case (d+ 1): ∀ i, ∆+i = 0 and ∆−i = 1.
• For every p ∈ ∂(Adr), if there exists an i ∈ [1 : d] such that pi = 0, letting imax =
max{ i ∣∣ pi = 0}, then the output bits satisfy Case imax, otherwise (∀ i, pi 6= 0 and ∃i,
pi = ri − 1), the output bits satisfy Case d+ 1.
The circuit C defines a valid color assignment ColorC : A
d
r → {1, 2, ..., d + 1} by setting
ColorC [p] = i, if the output bits of C evaluated at p satisfy Case i.
To define our high-dimensional Brouwer’s fixed point problems, we need a notion of well-
behaved functions (please note that this is not the function for the fixed point problem) to
parameterize the shape of the search space. An integer function f(n) is called well-behaved if it
is polynomial-time computable and there exists an integer constant n0 such that 3 ≤ f(n) ≤ n/2
for all n ≥ n0. For example, f1(n) = 3, f2(n) = ⌊n/2⌋, f3(n) = ⌊n/3⌋, and f4(n) = ⌊log n⌋ are
all well-behaved.
Definition 4.5 (Brouwerf). For each well-defined function f , the search problem Brouwerf
is defined as following: Given an input instance of Brouwerf , (C, 0n), where C is a valid
Brouwer-mapping circuit with parameters d = ⌈n/f(n)⌉ and r ∈ Zd+ where ∀i ∈ [1 : d], ri = 2f(n),
find a panchromatic simplex of C.
The input size of Brouwerf is the sum of n and the size of the circuit C. Brouwerf2 is a
two-dimensional search problem over grid [0 : 2⌊n/2⌋−1]2 and Brouwerf3 is a three-dimensional
search problem over grid [0 : 2⌊n/3⌋ − 1]3, while Brouwerf1 is a ⌈n/3⌉-dimensional search
problem over grid [0 : 7]⌈n/3⌉. Each of these three grids contains about 2n hypercubes. Both
Brouwerf2 [9] and Brouwerf3 [18] are known to be PPAD-complete. In section 7, we will
prove the following theorem, which states that the complexity of finding a panchromatic simplex
is essentially independent of the shape or dimension of the search space. In particular, it implies
that Brouwerf1 is also PPAD-complete.
Theorem 4.6 (High-Dimensional Discrete Fixed Points). For each well-behaved function f ,
Brouwerf is PPAD-complete.
4.2 Generalized Circuits and Their Assignment Problem
To effectively connect discrete Brouwer fixed points with two-player Nash equilibria, we use an
intermediate structure called the generalized circuit. This family of circuits, motivated by the
reduction of [18, 10, 20], extends the standard classes of Boolean or Arithmetic circuits in several
aspects.
Syntactically, a generalized circuit S = (V,T ) is a pair, where V is a set of nodes and T is a
collection of gates. Every gate T ∈ T is a 5-tuple T = (G, v1, v2, v, α) in which
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Figure 1: An example of generalized circuits
• G ∈ {Gζ , G×ζ , G=, G+, G−, G<, G∧, G∨, G¬ } is the type of the gate;
• v1, v2 ∈ V ∪ {nil} are the first and second input nodes of the gate;
• v ∈ V is the output node, and α ∈ R ∪ {nil}.
The collection T of gates must satisfy the following property: For every two gates T = (G, v1, v2, v, α)
and T ′ = (G′, v′1, v
′
2, v
′, α′) in T , v 6= v′.
Suppose T = (G, v1, v2, v, α) in T . If G = Gζ , then the gate has no input node and v1 =
v2 = nil. If G ∈ {G×ζ , G=, G¬ }, then v1 ∈ V and v2 = nil. If G ∈ {G+, G−, G<, G∧, G∨ }, then
v1, v2 ∈ V and v1 6= v2. Parameter α is only used in Gζ and G×ζ gates. If G = Gζ , then α ∈ R
and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1/|V |. If G = G×ζ , then 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. For other types of gates, α = nil.
The input size of a generalized circuit is the sum of |V | and the total number of bits needed
to specify the α parameters in S = (V,T ). As an important point which will become clear later,
we make the following remark: In all generalized circuits that we will construct, the number of
bits of each α parameter is upper bounded by poly(|V |).
In addition to its more expanded list of gate types, the generalized circuit differs crucially
from the standard circuit in that it does not require the circuit to be acyclic. In other words, in
a generalized circuit, the directed graph defined by connecting input nodes of all gates to their
output counterparts may have cycles. We shall show later that the presence of cycles is necessary
and sufficient to express fixed point computations with generalized circuits.
Semantically, we associate every node v ∈ V with a real variable x[v]. Each gate T ∈
T requires that the variables of its input and output nodes satisfy certain constraints, either
arithmetic or logical, depending on the type of the gate. By setting ǫ = 0, the constraints
are defined in Figure 2. The notation = ǫB in Figure 2 will be defined shortly. A generalized
circuit defines a set of K = |V | constraints, or a mathematical program, over the set of variables
{x[v] | v ∈ V }.
Suppose S = (V,T ) is a generalized circuit and K = |V |. For every ǫ ≥ 0, an ǫ-approximate
solution to circuit S is an assignment to the variables {x[v] | v ∈ V } such that
• the values of x satisfy constraint P[ǫ] = [ 0 ≤ x[v] ≤ 1/K + ǫ,∀ v ∈ V ]; and
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G = Gζ : P[T, ǫ] =
[
x[v] = α± ǫ
]
G = G×ζ : P[T, ǫ] =
[
x[v] = min
(
αx[v1], 1/K
)± ǫ ]
G = G= : P[T, ǫ] =
[
x[v] = min
(
x[v1], 1/K
)± ǫ ]
G = G+ : P[T, ǫ] =
[
x[v] = min
(
x[v1] + x[v2], 1/K
)± ǫ ]
G = G− : P[T, ǫ] =
[
min
(
x[v1]− x[v2], 1/K
) − ǫ ≤ x[v] ≤ max (x[v1]− x[v2], 0) + ǫ ]
G = G< : P[T, ǫ] =
[
x[v] = ǫB 1 if x[v1] < x[v2]− ǫ; x[v] = ǫB 0 if x[v1] > x[v2] + ǫ
]
G = G∨ : P[T, ǫ] =
[
x[v] = ǫB 1 if x[v1] =
ǫ
B 1 or x[v2] =
ǫ
B 1
x[v] = ǫB 0 if x[v1] =
ǫ
B 0 and x[v2] =
ǫ
B 0
]
G = G∧ : P[T, ǫ] =
[
x[v] = ǫB 0 if x[v1] =
ǫ
B 0 or x[v2] =
ǫ
B 0
x[v] = ǫB 1 if x[v1] =
ǫ
B 1 and x[v2] =
ǫ
B 1
]
G = G¬ : P[T, ǫ] =
[
x[v] = ǫB 0 if x[v1] =
ǫ
B 1; x[v] =
ǫ
B 1 if x[v1] =
ǫ
B 0
]
Figure 2: Constraints P[T, ǫ], where T = (G, v1, v2, v, α)
• for each gate T = (G, v1, v2, v, α) ∈ T , the values of x[v1],x[v2] and x[v] satisfy the con-
straint P[T, ǫ], defined in Figure 2.
Among the nine types of gates, Gζ , G×ζ , G=, G+ and G− are arithmetic gates implementing
arithmetic constraints like addition, subtraction and constant multiplication. G< is a brittle
comparator; it only distinguishes values that are properly separated. Finally, G∧, G∨ and G¬ are
logic gates. For an assignment to variables {x[v] | v ∈ V }, the value of x[v] represents boolean
1 with precision ǫ, denoted by x[v] = ǫB 1, if 1/K − ǫ ≤ x[v] ≤ 1/K + ǫ; it represents boolean 0
with precision ǫ, denoted by x[v] = ǫB 0, if 0 ≤ x[v] ≤ ǫ. We will use x[v] = 1/K ± ǫ to denote the
constraint that the value of x[v] lies in [1/K − ǫ, 1/K + ǫ]. The logic constraints implemented by
the three logic gates are defined similarly as the classical ones.
From the reduction in Section 6, we can prove the following theorem. A proof can be found
in Appendix B.
Theorem 4.7. For any constant c > 0, every generalized circuit S = (V,T ) has a 1/|V |c-
approximate solution.
Let c be a positive constant. We use Polyc-Gcircuit, and Expc-Gcircuit to denote the
problems of finding a K−c-approximate solution and a 2−cK-approximate solution, respectively,
of a given generalized circuit with K nodes.
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5 Main Results and Proof Outline
As the main technical result of our paper, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 5.1 (Main). For any constant c > 0, Polyc-Bimatrix is PPAD-complete.
This theorem immediately implies the following statements about the complexity of computing
and approximating two-player Nash equilibria.
Theorem 5.2 (Complexities of Bimatrix). Bimatrix is PPAD-complete. Moreover, it does
not have a fully-polynomial-time approximation scheme, unless PPAD is contained in P.
By Proposition 2.1, Bimatrix does not have a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme
in the relative approximation of Nash equilibria.
Setting ǫ = 1/poly(n), by Theorem 5.1 and Lemma 3.2, we obtain following theorem on the
smoothed complexity of two-player Nash equilibria:
Theorem 5.3 (Smoothed Complexity of Bimatrix). Bimatrix is not in smoothed polynomial
time, under uniform or Gaussian perturbations, unless PPAD is contained in RP.
Corollary 5.4 (Smoothed Complexity of Lemke-Howson). If PPAD is not contained in RP,
then the smoothed complexity of the Lemke-Howson algorithm is not polynomial.
By Proposition 2.3, we obtain the following corollary from Theorem 5.1 about the complexity
of Bit-Bimatrix.
Corollary 5.5 (Bit-Bimatrix). For any constant c > 1, (c log n)-Bit-Bimatrix, the problem of
finding the first c log n bits of a Nash equilibrium in a bimatrix game is polynomial-time equivalent
to Bimatrix.
To prove Theorem 5.1, we will start with the discrete fixed point problem Brouwerf1 (recall
that f1(n) = 3 for all n). As f1 is a well-behaved function, Theorem 4.6 implies that Brouwer
f1
is a PPAD-complete problem. We then apply the following three lemmas to reduce Brouwerf1
to Polyc-Bimatrix.
Lemma 5.6 (FPC toGcircuit). Brouwerf1 is polynomial-time reducible to Poly3-Gcircuit.
Lemma 5.7 (Gcircuit toBimatrix). Poly3-Gcircuit is polynomial-time reducible to Poly12-
Bimatrix.
Lemma 5.8 (Padding Bimatrix Games). If Polyc-Bimatrix is PPAD-complete for some con-
stant c > 0, then Polyc
′
-Bimatrix is PPAD-complete for every constant c′ > 0.
We will prove Lemma 5.6 and Lemma 5.7, respectively, in Section 8 and Section 6. A proof
of Lemma 5.8 can be found in Appendix C.
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6 Simulating Generalized Circuits with Nash Equilibria
In this section, we reduce Poly3-Gcircuit, the problem of computing a 1/K3-approximate
solution of a generalized circuit of K nodes, to Poly12-Bimatrix. As every two-player game has
a Nash equilibrium, this reduction also implies that every generalized circuit with K nodes has a
1/K3-approximate solution.
6.1 Outline of the Reduction
Suppose S = (V,T ) is a generalized circuit. Let K = |V | and N = 2K. Let C be a one-to-
one map from V to {1, 3, ..., 2K − 3, 2K − 1}. From every vector x ∈ RN , we define two maps
x, xC : V → R: For every node v ∈ V , supposing C(v) = 2k − 1, we set x[v] = x2k−1 and
xC [v] = x2k−1 + x2k.
In our reduction, we will build an N × N bimatrix game GS = (AS ,BS). Our construction
will take polynomial time and ensure the following properties for ǫ = 1/K3.
• Property A1: |aSi,j |, |bSi,j | ≤ N3, for all i, j : 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N and
• Property A2: for every ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium (x,y) of game GS , x is an
ǫ-approximate solution to S.
Then, we normalize GS to obtain GS = (AS ,BS) by setting
aS i,j =
aSi,j +N
3
2N3
and bS i,j =
bSi,j +N
3
2N3
, for all i, j : 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N.
Property A2 implies that for every ǫ/(2N
3)-well-supported equilibrium (x,y) of GS , x is an
ǫ-approximate solution to S. By Lemma 2.2, from every 2/N12-approximate Nash equilibrium of
GS , we can compute an ǫ-approximate solution to S in polynomial time.
In the remainder of this section, we assume ǫ = 1/K3.
6.2 Construction of Game GS
To construct GS , we transform a prototype game G∗= (A∗,B∗), an N ×N zero-sum game to be
defined in Section 6.3, by adding |T | carefully designed “gadget” games: For each gate T ∈ T ,
we define a pair of N ×N matrices (L[T ],R[T ]), according to Figure 3. Then, we set
GS = (AS ,BS), where AS = A∗ +
∑
T∈T
L[T ] and BS = B∗ +
∑
T∈T
R[T ].
For each gate T ∈ T , L[T ] and R[T ] defined in Figure 3 satisfy the following property.
Property 1. Let T = (G, v1, v2, v, α), L[T ] = (Li,j) and R[T ] = (Ri,j). Suppose C(v) = 2k − 1.
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L[T ] and R[T ], where gate T = (G, v1, v2, v, α)
Set L[T ] = (Li,j) = R[T ] = (Ri,j) = 0, k = C(v), k1 = C(v1) and k2 = C(v2)
G+ : L2k−1,2k−1 = L2k,2k = R2k1−1,2k−1 = R2k2−1,2k−1 = R2k−1,2k = 1.
Gζ : L2k−1,2k = L2k,2k−1 = R2k−1,2k−1 = 1, Ri,2k = α,∀ i : 1 ≤ i ≤ 2K.
G×ζ : L2k−1,2k−1 = L2k,2k = R2k−1,2k = 1, R2k1−1,2k−1 = α.
G= : L2k−1,2k−1 = L2k,2k = R2k1−1,2k−1 = R2k−1,2k = 1.
G− : L2k−1,2k−1 = L2k,2k = R2k1−1,2k−1 = R2k2−1,2k = R2k−1,2k = 1.
G< : L2k−1,2k = L2k,2k−1 = R2k1−1,2k−1 = R2k2−1,2k = 1.
G∨ : L2k−1,2k−1 = L2k,2k = R2k1−1,2k−1 = R2k2−1,2k−1 = 1, Ri,2k = 1/(2K),∀ i : 1 ≤ i ≤ 2K.
G∧ : L2k−1,2k−1 = L2k,2k = R2k1−1,2k−1 = R2k2−1,2k−1 = 1, Ri,2k = 3/(2K),∀ i : 1 ≤ i ≤ 2K.
G¬ : L2k−1,2k = L2k,2k−1 = R2k1−1,2k−1 = R2k1,2k = 1.
Figure 3: Matrices L[T ] and R[T ]
Then,
i 6∈ {2k, 2k − 1} ⇒ Li,j = 0, ∀ j ∈ [1 : 2K];
j 6∈ {2k, 2k − 1} ⇒ Ri,j = 0, ∀ i ∈ [1 : 2K];
i ∈ {2k, 2k − 1} ⇒ 0 ≤ Li,j ≤ 1, ∀ j ∈ [1 : 2K];
j ∈ {2k, 2k − 1} ⇒ 0 ≤ Ri,j ≤ 1, ∀ i ∈ [1 : 2K].
6.3 The Prototype Game and Its Properties
The prototype G∗ = (A∗,B∗) is the bimatrix game called Generalized Matching Pennies with
parameter M = 2K3:
A∗ =


M M 0 0 · · · 0 0
M M 0 0 · · · 0 0
0 0 M M · · · 0 0
0 0 M M · · · 0 0
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 0 0 · · · M M
0 0 0 0 · · · M M


.
A∗ is a K ×K block-diagonal matrix where each diagonal block is a 2× 2 matrix of all M ’s, and
B∗ = −A∗. All games we will consider below belong to the following class:
Definition 6.1 (Class L). A bimatrix game (A,B) is a member of L if the entries in A −A∗
and B−B∗ are in [0 : 1].
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Note that every Nash equilibrium (x,y) of G∗ enjoys the following nice property: For all
v ∈ V , xC [v] = yC [v] = 1/K. We first prove an extension of this property for bimatrix games in
L. Recall ǫ = 1/K3.
Lemma 6.2 (Nearly Uniform Capacities). For every bimatrix game (A,B) ∈ L, if (x,y) is a
1.0-well-supported Nash equilibrium of (A,B), then
1/K − ǫ ≤ xC [v], yC [v] ≤ 1/K + ǫ, for all v ∈ V.
Proof. Recall that 〈a|b〉 denotes the inner product of two vectors a and b of the same length.
By the definition of class L, for each k, the 2k − 1st and 2kth entries of rows a2k−1 and a2k in A
are in [M,M + 1] and all other entries in these two rows are in [0, 1]. Thus, for any probability
vector y ∈ Pn and for each node v ∈ V , supposing C(v) = 2k − 1, we have
MyC [v] ≤ 〈a2k−1|y〉 , 〈a2k|y〉 ≤ MyC [v] + 1. (1)
Similarly, the (2l− 1)th and 2lth entries of columns b2l−1 and b2l in B are in [−M,−M +1] and
all other entries in these two columns are in [0, 1]. Thus, for any probability vector x ∈ Pn and
for each node v ∈ V , supposing C(v) = 2l − 1, we have
−MxC [v] ≤ 〈b2l−1|x〉 , 〈b2l|x〉 ≤ −MxC [v] + 1. (2)
Now, suppose (x,y) is a t-well-supported Nash equilibrium of (A,B) for t ≤ 1. To warm up,
we first prove that for each node v ∈ V , if yC [v] = 0 then xC [v] = 0. Note that yC [v] = 0 implies
there exists v′ ∈ V with yC [v′] ≥ 1/K. Suppose C(v) = 2l − 1 and C(v′) = 2k − 1. By Inequality
(1),
〈a2k|y〉 −max
(
〈a2l|y〉 , 〈a2l−1|y〉
)
≥MyC [v′]−
(
MyC [v] + 1
) ≥M/K − 1 > 1
In other words, the payoff of the first player P1 when choosing the 2k
th row is more than 1 plus
the payoff of P1 when choosing the 2l
th or the (2l− 1)th row. Because (x,y) is a t-well-supported
Nash equilibrium with t ≤ 1, we have xC [v] = 0.
Next, we prove |xC [v] − 1/K | < ǫ for all v ∈ V . To derive a contradiction, we assume that
this statement is not true. Then, there exist v, v′ ∈ V such that xC [v] − xC [v′] > ǫ. Suppose
C(v) = 2l − 1 and C(v′) = 2k − 1. By Inequality (2),
〈b2k|x〉 −max
(
〈b2l|x〉 , 〈b2l−1|x〉
)
≥ −MxC [v′]−
(−MxC [v] + 1) > 1,
since M = 2K3 = 2/ǫ. This would imply yC [v] = 0, and in turn imply xC [v] = 0, contradicting
our assumption that xC [v] > xC [v
′] + ǫ > 0.
We can similarly show |yC [v]− 1/K | < ǫ for all v ∈ V .
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6.4 Correctness of the Reduction
We now prove that, for every ǫ-well-supported equilibrium (x,y) of GS , x is an ǫ-approximate
solution to S = (V,T ). It suffices to show, to be accomplished by the next two lemmas, that x
satisfies the following collection of 1 + |T | constraints.
{
P[ǫ], and P[T, ǫ], T ∈ T
}
.
Lemma 6.3 (Constraint P[ǫ]). Bimatrix game GS is in L. Thus, for every ǫ-well-supported Nash
equilibrium (x,y) of GS , x satisfies constraint P[ǫ] = [ 0 ≤ x[v] ≤ 1/K + ǫ,∀ v ∈ V ].
Proof. For each gate T ∈ T , L[T ] and R[T ]) defined in Figure 3 satisfy Property 1. By the
definition the generalized circuit, gates in T have distinct output nodes, so GS ∈ L. The second
statement of the lemma then follows from Lemma 6.2.
Lemma 6.4 (Constraints P [T, ǫ]). Let (x,y) be an ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium of GS .
Then, for each gate T ∈ T , x satisfies constraint P[T, ǫ].
Proof. Recall P[T, ǫ] is a constraint defined in Figure 2. By Lemma 6.3, x and y satisfy
1/K − ǫ ≤ xC [v], yC [v] ≤ 1/K + ǫ, for all v ∈ V.
Let T = (G, v1, v2, v, α) be a gate in T . Suppose C(v) = 2k − 1. Let a∗i and li denote the ith
row vectors of A∗ and L[T ], respectively; let b∗j and rj denote the j
th column vectors of B∗ and
R[T ], respectively.
From Property 1, L[T ] and R[T ] are the only two gadget matrices that modify the entries in
rows a∗2k−1,a
∗
2k and in columns b
∗
2k−1, b
∗
2k, in the transformation from the prototype G∗ to GS .
Thus, we have
aS2k−1 = a
∗
2k−1 + l2k−1, a
S
2k = a
∗
2k + l2k; and (3)
bS2k−1 = b
∗
2k−1 + r2k−1, b
S
2k = b
∗
2k + r2k. (4)
Now, we prove x satisfies constraint P[T, ǫ]. Here we only consider the case when G = G+. In
this case, we need to prove x[v] = min(x[v1] +x[v2], 1/K )± ǫ. Proofs for other types of gates are
similar and can be found in Appendix D.
Since a∗2k−1 = a
∗
2k and b
∗
2k−1 = b
∗
2k, from (3), (4) and Figure 3, we have〈
x|bS2k−1
〉− 〈x|bS2k〉 = x[v1] + x[v2]− x[v], and (5)〈
aS2k−1|y
〉− 〈aS2k|y〉 = y[v]− (yC [v] − y[v]). (6)
In a proof by contradiction, we consider two cases. First, we assume x[v] > min(x[v1] +
x[v2], 1/K) + ǫ. Since x[v] ≤ 1/K + ǫ, the assumption would imply x[v] > x[v1] + x[v2] + ǫ.
By Equation (5), we have y[v] = y2k−1 = 0, because (x,y) is an ǫ-well-supported Nash equilib-
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rium. On the other hand, since yC [v] = 1/K± ǫ≫ ǫ, by Equation (6), we have x[v] = x2k−1 = 0,
contradicting our assumption that x[v] > x[v1] + x[v2] + ǫ > 0.
Next, we assume x[v] < min(x[v1] + x[v2], 1/K) − ǫ ≤ x[v1] + x[v2] − ǫ. Then, Equation (5)
implies y[v] = yC [v]. By Equation (6), we have x[v] = xC [v] and thus, x[v] ≥ 1/K − ǫ, which
contradicts our assumption that x[v] < min(x[v1] + x[v2], 1/K) − ǫ ≤ 1/K − ǫ.
We have now completed the proof of Lemma 5.7. To prove our main technical Theorem 5.1,
we only need to prove Theorem 4.6 and Lemma 5.6.
7 PPAD-Completeness of Brouwerf
To prove Theorem 4.6, we reduce a two-dimensional instance of Brouwerf2 , that is, a valid 3-
coloring of a 2-dimensional grid, to Brouwerf , where recall l f2(n) = ⌊n/2⌋. The basic idea of the
reduction is to iteratively embed an instance of Brouwer into a hypergrid one dimension higher
to eventually “fold” or embed this two-dimensional input instance into the desired hypergrid.
We use the following concept to describe our embedding processes. A triple T = (C, d, r) is a
coloring triple if r ∈ Zd with ri ≥ 7 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ d and C is a valid Brouwer-mapping circuit
with parameters d and r. Let Size [C] denote the number of gates plus the number of input and
output variables in a circuit C.
Our embedding is carried out by a sequence of three polynomial-time transformations: L1(T, t, u),
L2(T, u), and L3(T, t, a, b). They embed a coloring triple T into a larger T ′ (that is, the volume
of the search space of T ′ is greater than the one of T ) such that from every panchromatic simplex
of T ′, one can find a panchromatic simplex of T efficiently.
To simplify our proof, in the context of this section, we slightly modify the definition of
Brouwerf : In the original definition, each valid Brouwer-mapping circuit C defines a color
assignment from the search space to {1, 2, 3, ..., d, d + 1}. In this section, we replace the color
d + 1 by a special color “red”. In other words, if the output bits of C evaluated at p satisfy
Case i with 1 ≤ i ≤ d, then ColorC [p] = i; otherwise, the output bits satisfy Case d + 1, and
ColorC [p] =“red”.
We first prove a useful property of valid Brouwer-mapping circuits.
Property 2 (Boundary Continuity). Let C be a valid Brouwer-mapping circuit with parameters
d and r. If points p,p′ ∈ ∂(Adr) satisfy p′ = p+ et for some 1 ≤ t ≤ d and 1 ≤ pt ≤ rt − 2, then
ColorC [p] = ColorC [p
′].
Proof. By the definition, if C is a valid Brouwer-mapping circuit C with parameters d and r,
then for each p ∈ ∂
(
Adr
)
, ColorC [p] has the following property: If there exists an i ∈ [1 : d] such
that pi = 0, then ColorC [p] = max { i | pi = 0 }; otherwise, ∀i, pi 6= 0 and ∃i, pi = ri−1, we have
ColorC [p] = “red”. Thus, if 1 ≤ pt ≤ rt − 2, then ColorC [p] = ColorC [p′].
7.1 Reductions Among Coloring Triples
Both L1(T, t, u) and L2(T, u) are very simple operations:
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ColorC′ [p] of a point p ∈ Adr′ assigned by (C ′, d, r′) = L1(T, t, u)
1: if p ∈ ∂
(
Adr′
)
then
2: if there exists i such that pi = 0 then
3: ColorC′ [p] = imax = max{ i
∣∣ pi = 0}
4: else
5: ColorC′ [p] = red
6: else if pt ≤ rt then
7: ColorC′ [p] = ColorC [p]
8: else
9: ColorC′ [p] = red
Figure 4: How L1(T, t, u) extends the coloring triple T = (C, d, r)
• Given a coloring triple T = (C, d, r) and two integers 1 ≤ t ≤ d, u > rt, L1(T, t, u) pads
dimension t to size u, i.e., it builds a new coloring triple T ′ = (C ′, d, r′) with r′t = u and
r′i = ri, for all i : 1 ≤ i 6= t ≤ d.
• For integer u ≥ 7, L2(T, u) adds a dimension to T by constructing T ′ = (C ′, d+ 1, r′) such
that r′ ∈ Zd+1, r′d+1 = u and r′i = ri, for all i ∈ [1; d].
These two transformations are described in Figure 4 and Figure 5, respectively. We prove their
properties in the following two lemmas.
Lemma 7.1 (L1(T, t, u): Padding a Dimension). Given a coloring triple T = (C, d, r) and two
integers 1 ≤ t ≤ d and u > rt, we can construct a new coloring triple T ′ = (C ′, d, r′) that satisfies
the following two conditions:
A. For all i : 1 ≤ i 6= t ≤ d, r′i = ri, and r′t = u. In addition, there exists a polynomial g1(n)
such that Size [C ′] = Size [C] + O(g1(Size [r
′])) and T ′ can be computed in time polynomial
in Size [C ′]. We write T ′ = L1(T, t, u);
B. From each panchromatic simplex P ′ of coloring triple T ′, we can compute a panchromatic
simplex P of T in polynomial time.
Proof. We define circuit C ′ by its color assignment in Figure 4. Property A is true according to
this definition.
To show Property B, let P ′ ⊂ Kp be a panchromatic simplex of T ′. We first note that
pt < rt − 1, because had pt ≥ rt − 1, Kp would not contain color t according to the color
assignment. Thus, it follows from ColorC′ [q] = ColorC [q] for each q ∈ Adr that P ′ is also a
panchromatic simplex of the coloring triple T .
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ColorC′ [p] of a point p ∈ Ad+1r′ assigned by (C ′, d+ 1, r′) = L2(T, u)
1: if p ∈ ∂
(
Adr′
)
then
2: if there exists i such that pi = 0 then
3: ColorC′ [p] = imax = max{ i
∣∣ pi = 0}
4: else
5: ColorC′ [p] = red
6: else if pd+1 = 1 then
7: ColorC′ [p] = ColorC [pˆ], where pˆ ∈ Zd satisfying pˆi = pi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ d
8: else
9: ColorC′ [p] = red
Figure 5: How L2(T, u) extends the coloring triple T = (C, d, r)
Lemma 7.2 (L2(T, u): Adding a Dimension). Given a coloring triple T = (C, d, r) and integer
u ≥ 7, we can construct a new coloring triple T ′ = (C ′, d + 1, r′) that satisfies the following
conditions:
A. For all i : 1 ≤ i ≤ d, r′i = ri, and r′d+1 = u. Moreover, there exists a polynomial g2(n)
such that Size [C ′] = Size [C] + O(g2(Size [r
′])). T ′ can be computed in time polynomial in
Size [C ′]. We write T ′ = L2(T, u).
B. From each panchromatic simplex P ′ of coloring triple T ′, we can compute a panchromatic
simplex P of T in polynomial time.
Proof. For each point p ∈ Ad+1r′ , we use pˆ to denote the point z ∈ Adr with zi = pi, ∀ i ∈ [1 : d].
The color assignment of circuit C ′ is given in Figure 5. Clearly, Property A is true.
To prove Property B, we let P ′ ⊂ Kp be a panchromatic simplex of T ′. We note that
pd+1 = 0, for otherwise, Kp does not contain color d + 1. Note also that ColorC′ [q] = d + 1
for every q ∈ Ad+1r′ with qd+1 = 0. Thus, for every point q ∈ P ′ with ColorC′ [q] 6= d + 1,
we have qd+1 = 1. So, because ColorC′ [q] = ColorC [qˆ] for every q ∈ Ad+1r′ with qd+1 = 1,
P = { qˆ ∣∣ q ∈ P ′ and ColorC′ [q] 6= d+ 1} is a panchromatic simplex of T .
Transformation L3(T, t, a, b) is the one that does all the hard work.
Lemma 7.3 (L3(T, t, a, b): Snake Embedding). Given a coloring triple T = (C, d, r) and integer
1 ≤ t ≤ d, if rt = a(2b + 1) + 5 for two integers a, b ≥ 1, then we can construct a new triple
T ′ = (C ′, d+ 1, r′) that satisfies the following conditions:
A. For i : 1 ≤ i 6= t ≤ d, r′i = ri and r′t = a + 5 and r′d+1 = 4b + 3. Moreover, there exists a
polynomial g3(n) such that Size [C
′] = Size [C] +O(g3(Size [r
′])) and T ′ can be computed in
time polynomial in Size [C ′]. We write T ′ = L3(T, t, a, b).
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Figure 6: The two dimensional view of set W ⊂ Ad+1
r′
B. From each panchromatic simplex P ′ of coloring triple T ′, we can compute a panchromatic
simplex P of T in polynomial time.
Proof. Consider the domains Adr ⊂ Zd and Ad+1r′ ⊂ Zd+1 of our coloring triples. We form the
reduction L3(T, t, a, b) in three steps. First, we define a d-dimensional set W ⊂ Ad+1r′ that is
large enough to contain Adr. Second, we define a map ψ from W to A
d
r that (implicitly) specifies
an embedding of Adr into W . Finally, we build a circuit C
′ for Ad+1
r′
and show that from each
panchromatic simplex of C ′, we can, in polynomial time, compute a panchromatic simplex of C.
A two dimensional view of W ⊂ Ad+1
r′
is illustrated in Figure 6. We use a snake-pattern to
realize the longer tth dimension of Adr in the two-dimensional space defined by the shorter t
th and
(d+1)th dimensions of Ad+1
r′
. Formally, W consists of points p ∈ Ad+1
r′
satisfying 1 ≤ pd+1 ≤ 4b+1
and
if pd+1 = 1, then 2 ≤ pt ≤ a+ 4;
if pd+1 = 4b+ 1, then 0 ≤ pt ≤ a+ 2;
if pd+1 = 4(b− i)− 1 where 0 ≤ i ≤ b− 1, then 2 ≤ pt ≤ a+ 2;
if pd+1 = 4(b− i)− 3 where 0 ≤ i ≤ b− 2, then 2 ≤ pt ≤ a+ 2;
if pd+1 = 4(b− i)− 2 where 0 ≤ i ≤ b− 1, then pt = 2;
if pd+1 = 4(b− i) where 0 ≤ i ≤ b− 1, then pt = a+ 2.
To build T ′, we embed the coloring triple T into W . The embedding is implicitly given by a
natural surjective map ψ from W to Adr, a map that will play a vital role in our construction and
analysis. For each p ∈W , we use p[m] to denote the point q in Zd such that qt = m and qi = pi,
for all i : 1 ≤ i 6= t ≤ d. We define ψ(p) according to the following cases:
if pd+1 = 1, then ψ(p) = p[2ab+ pt]
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ColorC′ [p] of a point p ∈ Ad+1r′ assigned by (C ′, d+ 1, r′) = L3(T, t, a, b)
1: if p ∈W then
2: ColorC′ [p] = ColorC [ψ(p)]
3: else if p ∈ ∂ (Ad+1r′ ) then
4: if there exists i such that pi = 0 then
5: ColorC′ [p] = imax = max{ i
∣∣ pi = 0}
6: else
7: ColorC′ [p] = red
8: else if pd+1 = 4i where 1 ≤ i ≤ b and 1 ≤ pt ≤ a+ 1 then
9: ColorC′ [p] = d+ 1
10: else if pd+1 = 4i+ 1, 4i+ 2 or 4i+ 3 where 0 ≤ i ≤ b− 1 and pt = 1 then
11: ColorC′ [p] = d+ 1
12: else
13: ColorC′ [p] = red
Figure 7: How L3(T, t, a, b) extends the coloring triple T = (C, d, r)
if pd+1 = 4b+ 1, then ψ(p) = p[pt];
if pd+1 = 4(b− i)− 1 where 0 ≤ i ≤ b− 1, then ψ(p) = p[(2i + 2)a+ 4− pt];
if pd+1 = 4(b− i)− 3 where 0 ≤ i ≤ b− 2, then ψ(p) = p[(2i + 2)a+ pt];
if pd+1 = 4(b− i)− 2 where 0 ≤ i ≤ b− 1, then ψ(p) = p[(2i + 2)a+ 2];
if pd+1 = 4(b− i) where 0 ≤ i ≤ b− 1, then ψ(p) = p[(2i + 1)a+ 2].
Essentially, we map W bijectively to Adr along its t
th dimension with exception that when
the snake pattern of W is making a turn, we stop the advance in Adr, and continue the advance
after it completes the turn. Let ψi(p) denote the i
th component of ψ(p). Our embedding scheme
guarantees the following important property of ψ.
Property 3 (Boundary Preserving). Let p be a point in W ∩∂ (Ad+1r′ ). If there exists i such that
pi = 0, then max{ i | pi = 0} = max{ i | ψi(p) = 0}. Otherwise, all entries of p are non-zero
and there exists l such that pl = r
′
l − 1, in which case, all entries of point ψ(p) are nonzero and
ψl(p) = rl − 1.
The circuit C ′ specifies a color assignment of Ad+1
r′
according to Figure 7. C ′ is derived from
circuit C and map ψ. By Property 3, we can verify that C ′ is a valid Brouwer-mapping circuit
with parameters d+ 1 and r′.
Property A follows directly from our construction. In order to establish Property B of the
lemma, we prove the following collection of statements to cover all possible cases of the given
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panchromatic simplex P ′ of T ′. In the following statements, P ′ is a panchromatic simplex of T ′
in Ad+1
r′
and let p∗ ∈ Ad+1
r′
be the point such that P ′ ⊂ Kp∗ . We will also use the following
notation: For each p ∈ Ad+1
r′
, we will use p[m1,m2] to denote the point q ⊂ Zd+1 such that
qt = m1, qd+1 = m2 and qi = pi for all i : 1 ≤ i 6= t ≤ d.
Statement 1. If p∗t = 0, then p
∗
d+1 = 4b and furthermore, for every point p ∈ P ′ such that
ColorC′ [p] 6= d+ 1, ColorC [ψ(p[pt, 4b+ 1])] = ColorC′ [p].
Proof. First, note that p∗d+1 6= 4b+1, for otherwise, Kp∗ does not contain color d+1. Second, if
p∗d+1 < 4b, then each point q ∈ Kp∗ is colored according one of the conditions in line 3, 8 or 10
of Figure 7. Let q∗ ∈ Kp∗ be the “red” point in P ′. Then, q∗ must satisfy the condition in line
6 and hence there exists l such that q∗l = r
′
l − 1. By our assumption, p∗t = 0. Thus, if p∗d+1 < 4b,
then l 6∈ {t, d+ 1}, implying for each q ∈ Kp∗ , ql > 0 (as ql ≥ q∗l − 1 > 0) and ColorC′ [q] 6= l.
Then, Kp∗ does not contain color l, contradicting the assumption of the statement. Putting these
two cases together, we have p∗d+1 = 4b.
We now prove the second part of the statement. If pd+1 = 4b+ 1, then we are done, because
ColorC [ψ(p)] = ColorC′ [p] according to line 1 of Figure 7. Let us assume pd+1 = 4b. Since
the statement assumes ColorC′ [p] 6= d + 1, p satisfies the condition in line 3 and hence p ∈
∂ (Ad+1
r′
). By Property 2, we have ColorC′ [p[pt, 4b+ 1]] = ColorC′ [p], completing the proof of
the statement.
Statement 2. If p∗t = a+ 2 or a+ 3, then p
∗
d+1 = 0, and in addition, for each p ∈ P ′ such that
ColorC′ [p] 6= d+ 1, ColorC [ψ(p[pt, 1])] = ColorC′ [p].
Proof. If p∗d+1 > 0, then Kp∗ does not contain color d+ 1. So p
∗
d+1 = 0. In this case, pd+1 must
be 1, since ColorC′ [q] = d + 1 for any q ∈ Ad+1r′ with qd+1 = 0. Thus, ColorC [ψ(p[pt, 1])] =
ColorC′ [p[pt, 1]] = ColorC′ [p].
Statement 3. If p∗d+1 = 4b, then 0 ≤ p∗t ≤ a + 1. Moreover, for each p ∈ P ′ such that
ColorC′ [p] 6= d+ 1, ColorC [ψ(p[pt, 4b+ 1])] = ColorC′ [p].
Proof. The first part of the statement is straightforward. Similar to the proof of Statement 1,
we can prove the second part for the case when 0 ≤ pt ≤ a + 1. When pt = a + 2, we have
ψ(p) = ψ(p[pt, 4b+ 1]). Thus, ColorC [ψ(p[pt, 4b+ 1])] = ColorC [ψ(p)] = ColorC′ [p].
We can similarly prove the following statements.
Statement 4. If p∗d+1 = 4i+1 or 4i+2 for some 0 ≤ i ≤ b− 1, then p∗t = 1. Moreover, for each
p ∈ P ′ such that ColorC′ [p] 6= d+ 1, ColorC [ψ(p[2, pd+1])] = ColorC′ [p].
Statement 5. If p∗d+1 = 4i for some 1 ≤ i ≤ b − 1, then 1 ≤ p∗t ≤ a+ 1. In addition, for each
p ∈ P ′ such that ColorC′ [p] 6= d+1, if 2 ≤ pt ≤ a+1, then ColorC [ψ(p[pt, 4i + 1])] = ColorC′ [p];
if pt = 1, then ColorC [ψ(p[2, 4i + 1])] = ColorC′ [p].
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Statement 6. If p∗d+1 = 4i − 1 for some 1 ≤ i ≤ b, then 1 ≤ p∗t ≤ a + 1. Moreover, for each
p ∈ P ′ such that ColorC′ [p] 6= d+1, if 2 ≤ pt ≤ a+1, then ColorC [ψ(p[pt, 4i − 1])] = ColorC′ [p];
if pt = 1, then ColorC [ψ(p[2, 4i − 1])] = ColorC′ [p].
Statement 7. If p∗d+1 = 0, then 1 ≤ p∗t ≤ a + 3. In addition, for each p ∈ P ′ such that
ColorC′ [p] 6= d + 1, if 2 ≤ p∗t ≤ a + 1, then ColorC [ψ(p[pt, 1])] = ColorC′ [p]; if p∗t = 1, then
ColorC [ψ(p[2, 1])] = ColorC′ [p].
In addition,
Statement 8. p∗d+1 6= 4b+ 1.
Proof. If p∗d+1 = 4b+ 1 then Kp∗ does not contain color d+ 1.
Now suppose that P ′ is a panchromatic simplex of T ′. Let p∗ ∈ Zd+1 be the point such that
P ′ ⊂ Kp∗ . Then, P ′ and p∗ must satisfy the conditions of one of the statements above. By that
statement, we can transform every point p ∈ P ′, (aside from the one that has color d+ 1) back
to a point q in Adr to obtain a set P from P
′. Since P is accommodated, it is a panchromatic
simplex of C. Thus, with all the statements above, we specify an efficient algorithm to compute
a panchromatic simplex P of T given a panchromatic simplex P ′ of T ′.
7.2 PPAD-Completeness of Problem Brouwerf
We are now ready to prove the main result of this section.
Proof of Theorem 4.6. We reduce Brouwerf2 to Brouwerf in order to prove that the latter is
PPAD-complete. Recall, f2(n) = ⌊n/2⌋. Suppose (C, 02n) is an input instance of Brouwerf2 .
Let
l = f(11n) ≥ 3 , m′ =
⌈
n
l − 2
⌉
and m =
⌈
11n
l
⌉
.
We iteratively construct a sequence of coloring triples T = {T 0, T 1, ... Tw−1, Tw } for some
w = O(m), starting with T 0 = (C, 2, (2n, 2n)) and ending with Tw = (Cw,m, rw) where rw ∈ Zm
and rwi = 2
l, for all i ∈ [1 : m]. At the tth iteration, we apply either L1,L2 or L3 with properly
chosen parameters to build T t+1 from T t.
Below we give the details of our construction. In the first step, we call L1(T 0, 1, 2m
′(l−2)) to
get T 1 = (C1, 2, (2m
′(l−2), 2n)). This step is possible because m′(l − 2) ≥ n. We then invoke the
procedure in Figure 8. In each for-loop, the first component of r decreases by a factor of 2l−2,
while the dimension of the space increases by 1. After running the for-loop (m′ − 5) times, we
obtain a coloring triple T 3m
′−14 = (C3m
′−14, d3m
′−14, r3m
′−14) that satisfies4
d3m
′−14 = m′ − 3 , r3m′−141 = 25(l−2) , r3m
′−14
2 = 2
n and r3m
′−14
i = 2
l , ∀ i ∈ [3 : m′ − 3].
4 Remark: the superscript of C, d, ri, denotes the index of the iterative step. It is not an exponent!
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The Construction of T 3m
′−14 from T 1
1: for any t from 0 to m′ − 6 do
2: It can be proved inductively that T 3t+1 = (C3t+1, d3t+1, r3t+1) satisfies
d3t+1 = t+ 2, r3t+11 = 2
(m′−t)(l−2), r3t+12 = 2
n and r3t+1i = 2
l for all 3 ≤ i ≤ t+ 2
3: let u = (2(m
′−t−1)(l−2) − 5)(2l−1 − 1) + 5
4: [ u ≥ r3t+11 = 2(m
′−t)(l−2) under the assumption that t ≤ m′ − 6 and l ≥ 3 ]
5: T 3t+2 = L1 (T 3t+1, 1, u)
6: T 3t+3 = L3 (T 3t+2, 1, 2(m
′−t−1)(l−2), 2l−2 − 1)
7: T 3t+4 = L1 (T 3t+3, t+ 3, 2l )
Figure 8: The Construction of T 3m
′−14 from T 1
The Construction of Tw
′
from T 3m
′−14
1: let t = 0
2: while T 3(m
′+t)−14 = (C3(m
′+t)−14,m′ + t− 3, r3(m′+t)−14) satisfies r3(m′+t)−141 > 2l do
3: let k = ⌈ (r3(m′+t)−141 − 5)/(2l−1 − 1)⌉+ 5
4: T 3(m
′+t)−13 = L1 (T 3(m
′+t)−14, 1, (k − 5)(2l−1 − 1) + 5)
5: T 3(m
′+t)−12 = L3 (T 3(m
′+t)−13, 1, k, 2l−2 − 1)
6: T 3(m
′+t)−11 = L1 (T 3(m
′+t)−12, m′ + t− 2, 2l ), set t = t+ 1
7: let w′ = 3(m′ + t)− 13 and Tw′ = L1(T 3(m′+t)−14, 1, 2l)
Figure 9: The Construction of Tw
′
from T 3m
′−14
Next, we call the procedure given in Figure 9. Note that the while-loop must terminate in
at most 8 iterations because we start with r3m
′−14
1 = 2
5(l−2). The procedure returns a coloring
triple Tw
′
= (Cw
′
, dw
′
, rw
′
) that satisfies
w′ ≤ 3m′ + 11 , dw′ ≤ m′ + 5 , rw′1 = 2l , rw
′
2 = 2
n and rw
′
i = 2
l , ∀ i ∈ [3 : dw′ ].
We then repeat the whole process above on the second coordinate and obtain a coloring triple
Tw
′′
= (Cw
′′
, dw
′′
, rw
′′
) that satisfies
w′′ ≤ 6m′ + 21 , dw′′ ≤ 2m′ + 8 and rw′′i = 2l , ∀ i ∈ [1 dw
′′
].
The way in which we define m and m′ guarantees
dw
′′ ≤ 2m′ + 8 ≤ 2
(
n
l − 2 + 1
)
+ 8 ≤ 2
(
n
l/3
)
+ 10 =
6n
l
+ 10 ≤ 11n
l
≤ m.
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Finally, by applying L2 on coloring triple Tw
′′
for m − dw′′ times with parameter u = 2l,
we obtain Tw = (Cw,m, rw) with rw ∈ Zm and rwi = 2l, ∀ i ∈ [1 : m]. It follows from our
construction that w = O(m).
To see why the sequence T gives a reduction from Brouwerf2 to Brouwerf , let T i =
(Ci, di, ri) (again the superscript of C, d, r, denotes the index of the iteration). As sequence
{Size [ri] }0≤i≤w is nondecreasing and w = O(m) = O(n), by the Property A of Lemma 7.1, 7.2
and 7.3, there exists a polynomial g(n) such that
Size [Cw] = Size [C] +O
(
g (n)
)
.
By these Properties A again, we can construct the whole sequence T and in particular, triple
Tw = (Cw,m, rw), in time polynomial in Size [C].
Pair (Cw, 011n) is an input instance of Brouwerf . Given any panchromatic simplex P of
(Cw, 011n) and using the algorithms in Properties B of Lemma 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3, we can compute a
sequence of panchromatic simplices Pw = P,Pw−1..., P 0 iteratively in polynomial time, where P t
is a panchromatic simplex of T t and is computed from the panchromatic simplex P t+1 of T t+1.
In the end, we obtain P 0, which is a panchromatic simplex of (C, 02n).
8 Computing Fixed Points with Generalized Circuits
In this section, we show that fixed points can be modeled by generalized circuits. In particular,
we reduce the search of a panchromatic simplex in an instance of Brouwerf1 (which will be
simply referred to as Brouwer in this section) to Poly3-Gcircuit, the computation of a 1/K3-
approximate solution of a generalized circuit of K nodes. Recall f1(n) = 3. Our reduction will use
ideas from [18]. However, we will need to develop several new techniques to meet the geometric
and combinatorial challenges in the consideration of high-dimensional fixed points.
Suppose U = (C, 03n) is an input instance of Brouwer, which colors the hypergridBn = Zn[0,7]
with colors from {1, ..., n, n+1}. Let m be the smallest integer such that 2m ≥ Size [C] > n and
K = 26m, where Size [C] is the number of gates plus the number of input and output variables in
a Boolean circuit C. Please note that m = O(log |C|) and hence 2Θ(m) is polynomial in the input
size of U .
We will construct a generalized circuit SU = (V,T U ) with |V | = K in polynomial time. Our
construction ensures that,
• Property R: From every (1/K3)-approximate solution to SU , we can compute a panchro-
matic simplex P of circuit C in polynomial time.
In the rest of this section, we assume ǫ = 1/K3.
8.1 Overcome the Curse of Dimensionality
We prove a key geometric lemma (Lemma 8.2 below) for finding a panchromatic simplex in order
to overcome the curse of dimensionality. Our construction of SU will then build on this lemma.
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For a ∈ R+, let π(a) = max{ i | 0 ≤ i ≤ 7 and i < a } be the largest integer in [0 : 7] that is
smaller than a. Let En = {z1, z2, ..., zn, zn+1 } where zi = ei/K2 and zn+1 = −
∑
1≤i≤n ei/K
2.
For each i ∈ [1 : n+ 1], we encode the ith color in ColorC by vector zi.
For any p ∈ Rn+, let q = π(p) be the integer point in Bn = Zn[0,7] with qi = π(pi). Let
ξ(p) = zt, where t = ColorC [π(p)].
Definition 8.1 (Well-Positioned Points). A real number a ∈ R+ is poorly-positioned if there is
an integer t ∈ [0 : 7] such that |a − t | ≤ 80Kǫ = 80/K2. A point p ∈ Rn+ is well-positioned if
none of its components is poorly-positioned, otherwise, it is poorly-positioned.
Let S = {p1,p2, ...,ph } be a set of h points in Rn[0,8]. We define
IB(S) =
{
k
∣∣∣ pk is poorly-positioned } and IG(S) = {k ∣∣∣ pk is well-positioned }.
Lemma 8.2 (Key Geometry: Equiangle Averaging). Suppose U = (C, 03n) is an instance of
Brouwer. Let S = {pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n3} be n3 points in Rn[0,8] such that pi = pi−1 +
∑n
i=1 ei/K. If
there is a vector rk ∈ Rn[0,1/K2] for each k in IB(S), such that,∥∥∥ ∑k∈IG(S) ξ(pk) +∑k∈IB(S) rk
∥∥∥
∞
= O(ǫ),
then Q = {π(pk), k ∈ IG(S)} is a panchromatic simplex of C.
Proof. We first prove that Q′ = {qk = π(pk), 1 ≤ k ≤ n3 } is accommodated, and satisfies
|Q′ | ≤ n+1. Let qk = π(pk) for each k ∈ [1 : n3]. As sequence {pk}1≤k≤n3 is strictly increasing,
{qk}1≤k≤n3 is non-decreasing. Since n/K ≪ 1, there exists at most one ki for each i ∈ [1 : n],
such that qkii = q
ki−1
i +1, which implies that Q
′ is accommodated. Since {qk} is non-decreasing,
|Q′ | ≤ n+ 1. Because Q ⊂ Q′, Q is accommodated and |Q| ≤ n+ 1.
Next, we give an upper bound for |IB(S)|. Because 1/K2 ≪ 1/K ≪ 1, there is at most one
ki for each i, such that p
ki
i is poorly-positioned. Since every poorly-positioned point has at least
one poorly-positioned component, |IB(S)| ≤ n and |IG(S)| ≥ n3 − n.
Let Wi denote the number of points in {qk : k ∈ IG(S)} that are colored i by circuit C. To
prove Q is a panchromatic simplex, it suffices to show that Wi > 0 for all i ∈ [1 : n+ 1].
Let rG =
∑
k∈IG(S)
ξ(pk) and rB =
∑
k∈IB(S)
rk. Since |IB(S)| ≤ n and ‖rk ‖∞ ≤ 1/K2,
‖rB ‖∞ ≤ n/K2, and
‖rG ‖∞ ≤ ‖rB ‖∞ +O(ǫ) ≤ n/K2 +O(ǫ). (7)
Assume by way of contradiction that one of Wi is zero:
• If Wn+1 = 0, supposing Wi∗ = max1≤i≤nWi, then Wi∗ ≥ n2 − 1, as |IG(S)| ≥ n3 − n. But
rGi∗ ≥ (n2 − 1)/K2 ≫ n/K2 +O(ǫ), which contradicts (7) above, since ǫ = 1/K3.
• IfWt = 0 for t ∈ [1 : n], then we can assertWn+1 ≤ n2/2, for otherwise, |rGt | > n2/(2K2)≫
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ExtractBits(S, v, v1, v2, v3)
1: pick unused nodes v1, v2, v3, v4 ∈ V
2: Insert(S, (G=, v, nil, v1, nil))
3: for j from 1 to 3 do
4: pick unused vj1, vj2 ∈ V
5: Insert(S, (Gζ , nil, nil, vj1, 2−(6m+j))), Insert(S, (G<, vj1, vj , vj , nil))
6: Insert(S, (G×ζ , vj , nil, vj2, 2−j)), Insert(S, (G−, vj , vj2, vj+1, nil))
Figure 10: Function ExtractBits
n/K2 + O(ǫ), contradicting (7). Suppose Wi∗ = max1≤i≤n+1Wi. Then, Wi∗ ≥ n2 − 1 and
i∗ 6= n+ 1. So rGi∗ ≥ (n2 − 1− n/2)/K2 ≫ n/K2 +O(ǫ), contradicting (7).
As a result, Wi > 0 for all i ∈ [1 : n+ 1], and we have completed the proof of the lemma.
8.2 Construction of the Generalized Circuit SU
We will show how to implement Lemma 8.2, using a generalized circuit. Given an input U =
(C, 03n) of Brouwer, our objective is to design a generalized circuit SU = (V,T U ) with |V | = K,
such that, from any ǫ-approximate solution to SU , one can find a panchromatic simplex of C in
polynomial time. Recall that ǫ = 1/K3.
More precisely, we will design the generalized circuit SU that encodes n3 points in Rn[0,8],
simulates the π function, and simulates the boolean circuit C. Our SU has the property that in
each of its ǫ-approximate solution, the sum of the n3 vectors as given in Lemma 8.2 is close to
zero, i.e., O(ǫ). Then Q, as defined in Lemma 8.2, is a panchromatic simplex of C, which can be
computed from the approximate solution of SU in polynomial time.
Let us define some notations that will be useful. Suppose S = (V,T ) is a generalized circuit
with |V | = K. A node v ∈ V is said to be unused in S if none of the gates T ∈ T uses v as its
output node. Now, suppose T 6∈ T is a gate such that the output node of T is unused in S. We
will use Insert(S, T ) to denote the insertion of T into S. After calling Insert(S, T ), S becomes
(V,T ∪ {T}).
To encode these n3 points, let {vki }1≤k≤n3,1≤i≤n be n4 distinguished nodes in V . We start
with SU = (V, ∅) and insert a number of gates into it so that, in every ǫ-approximate solution x,
values of these nodes encode n3 points S = {pk : 1 ≤ k ≤ n3} in Rn[0,8] that approximately satisfy
all the conditions of Lemma 8.2. In our encoding, we let pki = 8Kx[v
k
i ].
We define two functions ExtractBits and ColoringSimulation. They are the building
blocks in our construction. ExtractBits implements the π function, and is given in Figure 10.
Lemma 8.3 (Encoding Binary). Suppose S = (V,T ) is a generalized circuit with |V | = K. For
each v ∈ V and three unused nodes v1, v2, v3 ∈ V , we let S ′ be the generalized circuit obtained
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after calling ExtractBits(S, v, v1, v2, v3). Then, in every ǫ-approximate solution x of S ′, if
a = 8Kx[v] is well-positioned, then x[vi] = ǫB bi, where b1b2b3 is the binary representation of
integer π(a) ∈ [0 : 7].
Proof. First we consider the case when π(a) = 7. As a ≥ 7 + 80Kǫ, we have x[v] ≥ 1/(2K) +
1/(4K) + 1/(8K) + 10ǫ. By Figure 10, x[v1] ≥ x[v]− 2ǫ, x[v1] = ǫB 1 in the first loop and
x[v2] ≥ x[v1]− x[v12]− ǫ ≥ x[v]− 2ǫ− (2−1x[v1] + ǫ)− ǫ
≥ x[v] − 2−1(1/K + ǫ)− 4ǫ ≥ 1/(4K) + 1/(8K) + 5ǫ.
Since x[v21] ≤ 1/(4K) + ǫ and x[v2]− x[v21] > ǫ, we have x[v2] = ǫB 1 and
x[v3] ≥ x[v2]− x[v22]− ǫ > 1/(8K) + 2ǫ.
As a result, x[v3]− x[v31] > ǫ and x[v3] = ǫB 1.
Next, we consider the general case that t < π(a) < t + 1 for 0 ≤ t ≤ 6. Let b1b2b3 be the
binary representation of t. As a is well-positioned, we have
b1/(2K) + b2/(4K) + b3/(8K) + 10ǫ ≤ x[v] ≤ b1/(2K) + b2/(4K) + (b3 + 1)/(8K) − 10ǫ.
With similar arguments, after the first loop one can show that x[v1] = ǫB b1 and
b2/(4K) + b3/(8K) + 5ǫ ≤ x[v2] ≤ b2/(4K) + (b3 + 1)/(8K) − 5ǫ.
After the second loop, we have x[v2] = ǫB b2 and
b3/(8K) + 2ǫ ≤ x[v3] ≤ (b3 + 1)/(8K) − 2ǫ.
Thus, x[v3] = ǫB b3.
Next, we introduce ColoringSimulation. Suppose S = (V,T ) is a generalized circuit with
|V | = K. Let {vi }i∈[1:n] be n nodes in V , and {v+i , v−i }i∈[1:n] ⊂ V be 2n unused nodes. We use
p ∈ Rn+ to denote the point encoded by nodes {vi}i∈[1:n], that is, pi = 8Kx[vi]. Imagine that
p is a point in S = {pk : 1 ≤ i ≤ n3}. ColoringSimulation(S, {vi}i∈[1:n] , {v+i , v−i }i∈[1:n])
simulates circuit C on input π(p), by inserting the following gates into S:
1. Pick 3n unused nodes {vi,j }i∈[1:n],j∈[1:3] in V .
Call ExtractBits(S, vt, vt,1, vt,2, vt,3), for each 1 ≤ t ≤ n;
2. View the values of {vi,j} as 3n input bits of C.
Insert the corresponding logic gates from {G∨, G∧, G¬} into S to simulate the evaluation
of C, one for each gate in C, and place the 2n output bits in {v+i , v−i }.
We obtain the following lemma for ColoringSimulation(S, {vi}i∈[1:n] , {v+i , v−i }i∈[1:n]) as a di-
rect consequence of Lemma 8.3.
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Lemma 8.4 (Point Coloring). Let S ′ be the generalized circuit obtained after calling the above
ColoringSimulation, and x be an ǫ-approximate solution to S ′. We let p ∈ Rn+ denote the
point with pi = 8Kx[vi] for all i ∈ [1 : n], and q = π(p). We use {∆+i [q],∆−i [q]}i∈[1:n] to denote
the 2n output bits of C evaluated at q. If p is a well-positioned point, then x[v+i ] =
ǫ
B ∆
+
i [q] and
x[v−i ] =
ǫ
B ∆
−
i [q] for all i ∈ [1 : n].
Note that if the point p in the lemma above is not well-positioned, then the values of {v+i , v−i }
could be arbitrary. However, according to the definition of generalized circuits, x must satisfy
0 ≤ x[v+i ],x[v−i ] ≤ 1/K + ǫ, ∀ i ∈ [1 : n].
Finally, we build the promised generalized circuit SU with a four-step construction. At the
beginning, SU = (V, ∅) and |V | = K.
Part 1: [ Equiangle Sampling Segment ]
Let {vki }1≤k≤n3,1≤i≤n be n4 nodes in V . We insert Gζ gates, with properly chosen parameters,
and G+ gates into SU to ensure that every ǫ-approximate solution x of SU satisfies
x[vki ] = min
(
x[v1i ] + (k − 1)/(8K2), 1/K
)
±O(ǫ), (8)
for all k ∈ [1 : n3] and i ∈ [1 : n].
Part 2: [ Point Coloring ]
Pick 2n4 unused nodes {vk+i , vk−i }i∈[1:n],k∈[1:n3] from V . For every k ∈ [1 : n3], we call
ColoringSimulation
(SU , {vki }, {vk+i , vk−i }i∈[1:n]).
Part 3: [ Summing up the Coloring Vectors ]
Pick 2n unused nodes {v+i , v−i }i∈[1:n] ⊂ V . Insert properly-valued G×ζ gates and G+ gates to
ensure in the resulting generalized circuit SU , each ǫ-approximate solution x satisfies
x[v+i ] =
∑
1≤k≤n3
( 1
K
x[vk+i ]
)
±O(n3ǫ) and x[v−i ] =
∑
1≤k≤n3
( 1
K
x[vk−i ]
)
±O(n3ǫ).
Part 4: [ Closing the Loop ]
For each i ∈ [1 : n], pick unused nodes v′i, v′′i ∈ V and insert the following gates:
Insert
(SU , (G+, v1i , v+i , v′i, nil)) , Insert (SU , (G−, v′i, v−i , v′′i , nil)) ,
and Insert
(SU , (G=, v′′i , nil, v1i , nil)) .
8.3 Analysis of the Reduction
We now prove the correctness of our construction.
Let x be an ǫ-approximate solution to SU . Let S = {pk,with pki = 8Kx[vki ], 1 ≤ k ≤ n3}
be the set of n3 points that we want to produce from x. Let IG = IG(S) and IB = IB(S). For
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each t ∈ IG, let ct ∈ [1 : n + 1] be the color of point qt = π(pt) assigned by C, and for each
i ∈ [1 : n+ 1], let Wi = |{t ∈ IG | ct = i}|.
It suffices to prove, as Q = {π(pk), k ∈ IG } can be computed in polynomial time, that Q is a
panchromatic simplex of C. The line of the proof is very similar to the one for Lemma 8.2. First,
we use the constraints introduced by the gates in Part 1 to prove the following two lemmas:
Lemma 8.5 (Not Too Many Poorly-Positioned Points). |IB | ≤ n, and hence |IG | ≥ n3 − n.
Proof. For each t ∈ IB , according to the definition of poorly-positioned points, there exists an
integer 1 ≤ l ≤ n such that ptl is a poorly-positioned number. We will prove that, for every integer
1 ≤ l ≤ n, there exists at most one t ∈ [1 : n3] such that ptl = 8Kx[vtl ] is poorly-positioned, which
implies |IB | ≤ n immediately.
Assume ptl and p
t′
l are both poorly-positioned, for a pair of integers 1 ≤ t < t′ ≤ n3. Then,
from the definition, there exists a pair of integers 0 ≤ k, k′ ≤ 7,
∣∣x[vtl ]− k/(8K)∣∣ ≤ 10ǫ and ∣∣x[vt′l ]− k′/(8K)∣∣ ≤ 10ǫ. (9)
Because (9) implies that x[vtl ] < 1/K − ǫ ≤ xC [vtl ] and x[vt
′
l ] < 1/K − ǫ ≤ xC [vt
′
l ], by Equation
(8) of Part 1, we have
x[vtl ] = x[v
1
l ] + (t− 1)/(8K2)±O(ǫ) and x[vt
′
l ] = x[v
1
l ] + (t
′ − 1)/(8K2)±O(ǫ). (10)
Hence, x[vtl ] < x[v
t′
l ], k ≤ k′ and
x[vt
′
l ]− x[vtl ] = (t′ − t)/(8K2)±O(ǫ) (11)
Note that when k = k′, Equation (9) implies that x[vt
′
l ] − x[vtl ] ≤ 20ǫ, while when k < k′, it
implies that x[vt
′
l ] − x[vtl ] ≥ (k′ − k)/(8K) − 20ǫ ≥ 1/(8K) − 20ǫ. In both cases, we derived an
inequality that contradicts (11). Thus, only one of ptl or p
t′
l can be poorly-positioned.
Lemma 8.6 (Accommodated). Q = {π(pk), k ∈ IG} is accommodated and |Q| ≤ n+ 1.
Proof. To show Q is accommodated, it is sufficient to prove
qtl ≤ qt
′
l ≤ qtl + 1, for all l ∈ [1 : n] and t, t′ ∈ IG such that t < t′. (12)
For the sake of contradiction, we assume that (12) is not true. We need to consider the following
two cases.
First, assume qtl > q
t′
l for some t, t
′ ∈ IG with t < t′. Since qt′l < qtl ≤ 7, we have pt
′
l < 7 and
thus, x[vt
′
l ] < 7/(8K). As a result, the first component of the min operator in (8) is the smallest
for both t and t′, implying that x[vtl ] < x[v
t′
l ] and p
t
l < p
t′
l . This contradicts the assumption that
qtl > q
t′
l .
Second, assume qt
′
l − qtl ≥ 2 for some t, t′ ∈ IG with t < t′. From the definition of π, we have
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pt
′
l − ptl > 1 and thus, x[vt
′
l ]− x[vtl ] > 1/(8K). But from (8), we have
x[vt
′
l ]− x[vtl ] ≤ (t′ − t)/(8K2) +O(ǫ) < n3/(8K2) +O(ǫ)≪ 1/(8K).
As a result, (12) is true.
Next, we prove |Q| ≤ n + 1. Note that the definition of Q together with (12) implies that
there exist integers t1 < t2 < ... < t|Q| ∈ IG such that qti is strictly dominated by qti+1 , that is,
qti 6= qti+1 and qtij ≤ qti+1j for all j ∈ [1 : n].
On the one hand, for every 1 ≤ l ≤ |Q| − 1, there exists an integer 1 ≤ kl ≤ n such that
q
tl+1
kl
= qtlkl + 1. On the other hand, for every 1 ≤ k ≤ n, (12) implies that there is at most one
1 ≤ l ≤ |Q| − 1 such that qtl+1k = qtlk + 1. Therefore, |Q| ≤ n+ 1.
The construction in Part 2 and Lemma 8.4 guarantees that:
Lemma 8.7 (Correct Encoding of Colors). For each 1 ≤ k ≤ n3, let rk denote the vector that
satisfies rki = x[v
k+
i ] − x[vk−i ], ∀i ∈ [1 : n]. For each t ∈ IG, rt = Kzct ± 2ǫ; for each t ∈ IB,
‖rt‖∞ ≤ 1/K + 2ǫ.
Recall that Part 3 sums up these n3 vectors
{
rk
}
. Let r denote the vector that satisfies
ri = x[v
+
i ]−x[v−i ], for all i ∈ [1 : n]. Ideally, with (the constraints of) the gates inserted in Part
4, we wish to establish ‖r‖∞ = O(ǫ). However, whether or not this condition holds depends
on the values of {v1i }1≤i≤n in x, as the gate (G−, a, b, c, nil) requires c = max(a− b, 0) within a
difference of ǫ. For example, in the case when x[v1i ] = 0, the magnitude of x[v
−
i ] could be much
larger than that of x[v+i ]. We are able to establish the following lemma which is sufficient to
carry out the correctness proof of our reduction.
Lemma 8.8 (Well-Conditioned Solution). For all i ∈ [1 : n],
1. if x[v1i ] > 4ǫ, then ri = x[v
+
i ]− x[v−i ] > −4ǫ; and
2. if x[v1i ] < 1/K − 2n3/K2, then ri = x[v+i ]− x[v−i ] < 4ǫ.
Proof. In order to set up a proof-by-contradiction of the first if-statement, we assume there exists
some i such that x[v1i ] > 4ǫ and x[v
+
i ]− x[v−i ] ≤ −4ǫ.
By the first gate (G+, v
1
i , v
+
i , v
′
i, nil) inserted in Part 4, we have
x[v′i] = min(x[v
1
i ] + x[v
+
i ], 1/K)± ǫ ≤ x[v1i ] + x[v+i ] + ǫ ≤ x[v1i ] + x[v−i ]− 3ǫ. (13)
By the second gate (G−, v
′
i, v
−
i , v
′′
i , nil), we have
x[v′′i ] ≤ max(x[v′i]− x[v−i ], 0) + ǫ ≤ max(x[v1i ]− 3ǫ, 0) + ǫ ≤ x[v1i ]− 2ǫ, (14)
where the last inequality follows from the assumption that x[v1i ] > 4ǫ. Since x[v
1
i ] ≤ 1/K + ǫ,
we have x[v′′i ] ≤ x[v1i ]− 2ǫ ≤ 1/K − ǫ < 1/K. So, by the last gate (G=, v′′i , nil, v1i , nil), we have
x[v1i ] = min(x[v
′′
i ], 1/K) ± ǫ = x[v′′i ]± ǫ, which contradicts (14).
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Similarly, to prove the second if-statement, we assume there exists some 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that
x[v1i ] < 1/K − 2n3/K2 and x[v+i ]− x[v−i ] ≥ 4ǫ in order to derive a contradiction.
By Part 3, x[v+i ] ≤ n3/K2 + O(n3ǫ). Together with the assumption, we have x[v1i ] + x[v+i ]
≤ 1/K − n3/K2 +O(n3ǫ) < 1/K. Thus, by the first gate G+, we have
x[v′i] = min(x[v
1
i ] + x[v
+
i ], 1/K) ± ǫ = x[v1i ] + x[v+i ]± ǫ ≥ x[v1i ] + x[v−i ] + 3ǫ
and x[v′i] ≤ x[v1i ] + x[v+i ] + ǫ ≤ 1/K − n3/K2 +O(n3ǫ). By the second gate G−,
x[v′′i ] ≥ min(x[v′i]− x[v−i ], 1/K) − ǫ = x[v′i]− x[v−i ]− ǫ ≥ x[v1i ] + 2ǫ. (15)
We also have x[v′′i ] ≤ max(x[v′i] − x[v−i ], 0) + ǫ ≤ x[v′i] + ǫ < 1/K. However, the last gate G=
implies x[v1i ] = min(x[v
′′
i ], 1/K) ± ǫ = x[v′′i ]± ǫ, which contradicts (15).
Now, we show that Q is a panchromatic simplex of C. By Lemma 8.6, it suffices to prove
that Wi > 0, for all i ∈ [1 : n+ 1].
By Part 3 of the construction and Lemma 8.7,
r =
1
K
∑
1≤i≤n3
ri ±O(n3ǫ) = 1
K
∑
i∈IG
ri +
1
K
∑
i∈IB
ri ±O(n3ǫ)
=
∑
i∈IG
zci +
1
K
∑
i∈IB
ri ±O(n3ǫ) =
∑
1≤i≤n+1
Wi z
i +
1
K
∑
i∈IB
ri ±O(n3ǫ)
= rG + rB ±O(n3ǫ).
where rG =
∑
1≤i≤n+1Wiz
i and rB =
∑
i∈IB
ri/K. Since |IB | ≤ n and ‖ri‖∞ ≤ 1/K + ǫ for
each i ∈ IB , we have ‖rB ‖∞ = O(n/K2).
As |IG | ≥ n3 − n, we have
∑
1≤i≤n+1Wi ≥ n3 − n. The next lemma shows that, if one of Wi
is equal to zero, then ‖rG‖∞ ≫ ‖rB ‖∞.
Lemma 8.9. If one of Wi is equal to zero, then ‖rG‖∞ ≥ n2/(3K2), and thus ‖r‖∞ ≫ 4ǫ.
Proof. We divide the proof into two cases. First, assume Wn+1 = 0. Let l ∈ [1 : n] be the integer
such that Wl = max1≤i≤nWi, then we have Wl > n
2 − 1. Thus, r′l = Wl/K ≥ (n2 − 1)/K >
n2/(3K2).
Second, assume Wt = 0 for some 1 ≤ t ≤ n. We have the following two cases:
• Wn+1 ≥ n2/2: r′t = −Wn+1/K ≤ −n2/(2K2) < −n2/(3K2).
• Wn+1 < n2/2: Let l be the integer such that Wl = max1≤i≤n+1Wi, then l 6= t, n + 1 and
Wl > n
2 − 1. Then, r′l = (Wl −Wn+1)/K > (n2/2− 1)/K2 > n2/(3K2).
Therefore, if Q is not a panchromatic simplex, then one of the Wi’s is equal to zero, and
hence ‖r‖∞ ≫ 4ǫ. Had Part 4 of our construction guaranteed that ‖r‖∞ = O(ǫ), we would
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have completed the proof. As it is not always the case, we prove the following lemma so that we
can use Lemma 8.8 to complete the proof.
Lemma 8.10 (Well-Conditioned). For all i ∈ [1 : n], 4ǫ < x[v1i ] < 1/K − 2n3/K2.
Proof. In this proof, we will use the following boundary condition of circuit C: For each q ∈ Bn
and 1 ≤ k 6= l ≤ n,
B.1: if qk = 0, then ColorC [q] 6= n+ 1;
B.2: if qk = 0 and ql > 0, then ColorC [q] 6= l;
B.3: if qk = 7, then ColorC [q] 6= k; and
B.4: if qk = 7 and ColorC [q] = l 6= k, then ql = 0.
These conditions follow directly from the definition of valid circuits. Recall 1/K = 2−6m, ǫ =
2−18m = 1/K3 and 2m > n.
First, if there exists an integer k ∈ [1 : n] such that x[v1k] ≤ 4ǫ, then qtk = 0 for all t ∈ IG. By
B.1, Wn+1 = 0. Let l be the integer such that Wl = max1≤i≤nWi. As
∑n+1
i=1 Wi = |IG | ≥ n3−n,
we have Wl ≥ n2 − 1. So, rl ≥ Wl/K2 − O(n/K2) − O(n3ǫ) ≫ 4ǫ. Now consider the following
two cases:
• If x[v1l ] < 1/K − 2n3/K2, then we get a contradiction in Lemma 8.8.
• If x[v1l ] ≥ 1/K − 2n3/K2, then for all t ∈ IG,
ptl = 8K
(
min
(
x[v1l ] + (t− 1)/(8K2), 1/K
) ±O(ǫ)) > 1
and hence qtl > 0. By B.2, we have Wl = 0, contradicting the assumption.
Second, if there exists an integer k ∈ [1 : n] such that x[v1k] ≥ 1/K − 2n3/K2, then for all
t ∈ IG, we have qtk = 7. By B.3, Wk = 0. If Wn+1 ≥ n2/2, then
rk ≤ −Wn+1/K2 +O(n/K2) +O(n3ǫ)≪ −4ǫ,
which contradicts the assumption that x[v1k] ≥ 1/K − 2n3/K2 > 4ǫ (see Lemma 8.8.1). Below,
we assume Wn+1 < n
2/2.
Let l be the integer such that Wl = max1≤i≤n+1Wi. Since Wk = 0, we have Wl ≥ n2 − 1 and
l 6= k. As Wn+1 < n2/2, Wl −Wn+1 > n2/2− 1 and thus,
rl ≥ (Wl −Wn+1)/K2 −O(n/K2)−O(n3ǫ)≫ 4ǫ.
We now consider the following two cases:
• If x[v1l ] < 1/K − 2n3/K2, then we get a contradiction in Lemma 8.8.2;
• If x[v1l ] ≥ 1/K −2n3/K2, then ptl > 1 and thus qtl > 0 for all t ∈ IG. By B.4, we have
Wl = 0 which contradicts the assumption.
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9 Extensions and Open Problems
9.1 Sparse Games are Hard
As fixed points and Nash equilibria are fundamental to many other search and optimization
problems, our results and techniques may have a broader scope of applications and implications.
So far, our complexity results on the computation and approximation of Nash equilibria have
been extended to Arrow-Debreu equilibria [28]. They can also be naturally extended to both
r-player games [45] and r-graphical games [33], for every fixed r ≥ 3. Since the announcement of
our work, it has been shown that the Nash equilibrium is PPAD-hard to approximate in fully
polynomial time even for bimatrix games with some special payoff structures, such as bimatrix
games in which all payoff entries are either 0 or 1 [14], or in which most of the payoff entries are
0. In the latter case, we can strengthen our gadgets to prove the following theorem:
Theorem 9.1 (Sparse Bimatrix). Nash equilibria remains PPAD-hard to approximate in
fully polynomial time for sparse bimatrix games in which each row and column of the two payoff
matrices contains at most 10 nonzero entries.
The reduction needed in proving this theorem is similar to the one used in proving Theorem
5.1. The key difference is that we first reduce Brouwerf1 to a sparse generalized circuit, where
a generalized circuit is sparse if each node is used by at most two gates as their input nodes. We
then refine our gadget games for Gζ , G∧ or G∨, to guarantee that the resulting bimatrix game is
sparse. Details of the proof can be found in [11].
9.2 Open Questions and Conjectures
There remains a complexity gap in the approximation of two-player Nash equilibria: Lipton,
Markakis and Mehta [40] show that an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium can be computed in
nO(logn/ǫ
2)-time, while this paper shows that, for ǫ of order 1/poly(n), no algorithm can find an
ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium in poly(n, 1/ǫ)-time, unless PPAD is contained in P. However,
our hardness result does not cover the case when ǫ is a constant between 0 and 1, or of order
1/polylog(n). Naturally, it is unlikely that finding an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium is PPAD-
complete when ǫ is an absolute constant, for otherwise, all search problems in PPAD would be
solvable in nO(logn)-time, due to the result of [40].
Thinking optimistically, we would like to see the following conjectures turn out to be true.
Conjecture 1 (PTAS for Bimatrix). There is an O(nk+ǫ
−c
)-time algorithm for finding an ǫ-
approximate Nash equilibrium in a two-player game, for some constants c and k.
Conjecture 2 (Smoothed Bimatrix). There is an algorithm for Bimatrix with smoothed com-
plexity O(nk+σ
−c
) under perturbations with magnitude σ, for some constants c and k.
For a sufficiently large ǫ, such as ǫ ≥ 1/2, an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium can be found
in polynomial time [19, 36], by examining small-support strategies. However, new techniques
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are needed to prove Conjecture 1 [22]. Lemma 2.2 implies that Conjecture 1 is true for ǫ-well-
supported Nash equilibrium if and only if it is true for ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium. For each
bimatrix game (A,B) such that rank(A+B) is a constant, Kannan and Theobald [31] found a
fully-polynomial-time algorithm to approximate Nash equilibria.
For Conjecture 2, one might be able to prove a weaker version of this conjecture by extending
the analysis of [4] to show that there is an algorithm for Bimatrix with smoothed complexity
nO(logn/σ
2). We also conjecture that Corollary 5.4 remains true without any complexity assump-
tion on PPAD. A positive answer would extend the result of Savani and von Stengel [50] to
smoothed bimatrix games. Another interesting question is whether the average-case complexity
of the Lemke-Howson algorithm is polynomial.
Of course, the fact that two-player Nash equilibria and Arrow-Debreu equilibria are PPAD-
hard to compute in the smoothed model does not necessarily imply that game and market prob-
lems are hard to solve in practice. In addition to possible noise and imprecision in inputs, practical
problems might have other special structure that makes equilibrium computation or approxima-
tion more tractable. The game and market problems and their hardness results might provide an
opportunity and a family of concrete problems for discovering new input models that can help us
to rigorously evaluate the performance of practical equilibrium algorithms and heuristics.
Theorem 5.2 implies that for any r > 2, the computation of an r-player Nash equilibrium can
be reduced in polynomial time to the computation of a two-player Nash equilibrium. However,
the implied reduction is not very natural: The r-player Nash equilibrium problem is first reduced
to End-of-Line, then to Brouwer, and then to Bimatrix. It remains an interesting question
to find a more direct reduction from r-player Nash equilibria to two-player Nash equilibria.
The following complexity question about Nash equilibria is due to Vijay Vazirani: Are the
counting versions of all PPAD complete-problems as hard as the counting version of Bimatrix?
Gilboa and Zemel [24] showed that deciding whether a bimatrix game has a unique Nash equi-
librium is NP-hard. Their technique was extended in [17] to prove that counting the number
of Nash equilibria is #P-hard. Because the reduction between search problems only requires a
many-to-one map between solutions, the number of solutions is not necessarily preserved. More
restricted reductions are needed to solve Vazirani’s question.
Finally, even though our results in this paper as well as the results of [18, 10, 20] provide
strong evidence that equilibrium computation might be hard for P, the hardness of the PPAD
complexity class itself is largely unknown [29]. On one hand, Megiddo [41] proved that if Bima-
trix is NP-hard, then NP = coNP. On the other hand, there are oracles that separate PPAD
from P, and various discrete fixed point problems such as the computational version of Sperner’s
Lemma, requires an exponential number of functional evaluations in the query model, determin-
istic [26, 8] or randomized [13], and in the quantum query model [23, 13]. It is desirable to find
stronger evidences that PPAD is not contained in P. Does the existence of one-way functions
imply that PPAD is not contained in P? Does “Factoring is not in P” imply that PPAD is
not contained in P? Characterizing the hardness of the PPAD class is a great and a challenging
problem.
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A Perturbation and Probabilistic Approximation
In this section, we prove Lemma 3.2. To help explain the probabilistic reduction from the ap-
proximation of bimatrix games to the solution of perturbed bimatrix games, we first define the
notion of many-way polynomial reductions among TFNP problems.
Definition A.1 (Many-way Reduction). Let F be a set of polynomial-time computable functions
and g be a polynomial-time computable function. A search problem SearchR1 ∈ TFNP is (F , g)-
reducible to SearchR2 ∈ TFNP if, for all y ∈ {0, 1}∗, (f(x), y) ∈ R2 implies (x, g(y)) ∈ R1 for
every input x of R1 and for every function f ∈ F .
Proof. (of Lemma 3.2) We will only give a proof of the lemma under uniform perturbations.
With a slightly more complex argument to handle the low probability case when the absolute value
of the perturbation is too large, we can similarly prove the lemma under Gaussian perturbations.
Suppose J is an algorithm with polynomial smoothed complexity for Bimatrix. Let TJ(A,B)
be the complexity of J for solving the bimatrix game defined by (A,B). Let Nσ() denotes the
uniform perturbation with magnitude σ. Then there exists constants c, k1 and k2 such that for
all 0 < σ < 1,
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max
A¯,B¯∈Rn×n
[−1,1]
,
EA←Nσ(A¯),B←Nσ(B¯) [TJ(A,B)] ≤ c · nk1σ−k2 .
For each pair of perturbation matrices S,T ∈ Rn×n[−σ,σ], we can define a function f(S,T) :
R
n×n ×Rn×n → Rn×n × Rn×n as f(S,T)((A¯, B¯)) = (A¯+ S, B¯+T). Let Fσ be the set of all such
functions, i.e.,
Fσ =
{
f(S,T)|S,T ∈ Rn×n[−σ,σ]
}
.
Let g be the identity function from Rn × Rn to Rn × Rn.
We now show that the problem of computing an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium is (Fǫ/2, g)-
reducible to the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium of perturbed instances. More specifically,
we prove that for every bimatrix game (A¯, B¯) and for every f(S,T) ∈ Fǫ/2, an Nash equilibrium
(x,y) of f(S,T)((A¯, B¯)) is an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium of (A¯, B¯).
Let A = A¯+ S and B = B¯+T. Then,
|xTAy − xT A¯y| = |xTSy| ≤ ǫ/2 (16)
|xTBy − xT B¯y| = |xTTy| ≤ ǫ/2. (17)
Thus, for each Nash equilibrium (x,y) of (A,B), for any (x′,y′),
(x′)T A¯y − xT A¯y ≤ ((x′)TAy− xTAy)+ ǫ ≤ ǫ.
Similarly, xT B¯y′ − xT B¯y ≤ ǫ. Therefore, (x,y) is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium of game (A¯, B¯).
Now given the algorithm J with polynomial smoothed time-complexity for Bimatrix, we can
apply the following randomized algorithm (with the help of a (Fǫ/2, g)-many-way reduction) to
find an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium of game (A¯, B¯):
Algorithm NashApproximationByPerturbations(A¯, B¯)
1. Randomly choose a pair of perturbation matrices S,T of magnitude σ and set
A = A¯+ S and B = B¯+T.
2. Apply algorithm J to find a Nash equilibrium (x,y) of (A,B).
3. Return (x,y).
The expected time complexity of NashApproximationByPerturbation is bounded from above
by the smoothed complexity of J when the magnitude perturbations is ǫ/2 and hence is at most
2k2c · nk1ǫ−k2 .
B Padding Generalized Circuits: Proof of Theorem 4.7
Suppose S = (V,T ) is a generalized circuit. Let K = |V |.
50
First, S has a 1/K3-approximate solution because 1) Poly3-Gcircuit is reducible to Poly12-
Bimatrix (Section 6); and 2) every two-player game has a Nash equilibrium. Thus, the theorem
is true for c ≤ 3.
To prove the theorem for the case when c > 3, we reduce Polyc-Gcircuit to Poly3-
Gcircuit. Suppose c = 2b + 1, where b > 1. We construct a new circuit S ′ = (V ′,T ′) by
inserting some dummy nodes into S as following:
• V ⊂ V ′, |V | = Kb > K and |T ′ | = |T | ;
• For each gate T = (G, v1, v2, v, α) ∈ T , if G /∈ {Gζ , G×ζ } (and thus, α = nil ), then T ∈ T ′;
otherwise, gate (G, v1, v2, v,K
1−bα) ∈ T ′.
Let x′ be a 1/|V ′ |3-approximate solution of S ′. Note that |V ′|3 = 1/K3b. We construct an
assignment x : V → R by setting x[v] = Kb−1x′[v] for every v ∈ V . One can easily check that x
is a 1/K2b+1-approximate solution to the original circuit S. We then apply 1/K2b+1 = 1/Kc.
C Padding Bimatrix Games: Proof of Lemma 5.8
Let c be the constant such that Polyc-Bimatrix is known to be PPAD-complete. If c < 2, then
finding an n−2-approximate Nash equilibrium is harder, and thus is also complete in PPAD.
With this, without loss of generality, we assume that c ≥ 2. To prove the lemma, we only need
to show that for every constant c′ such that 0 < c′ < c, Polyc-Bimatrix is polynomial-time
reducible to Polyc
′
-Bimatrix.
Suppose G = (A,B) is an n×n positively normalized two-player game. We transform it into
a new n× n game G′ = (A′,B′) as follows:
a′i,j = ai,j +
(
1− max
1≤k≤n
ak,j
)
and b′i,j = bi,j +
(
1− max
1≤k≤n
ai,k
)
, ∀ i, j : 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n.
One can verify that any ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium of G′ is also an ǫ-approximate Nash
equilibrium of G. Besides, every column of A′ and every row of B′ has at least one entry with
value 1.
Next, we construct an n′′ × n′′ game G′′ = (A′′,B′′) where n′′ = n 2cc′ > n as follows: A′′
and B′′ are both 2 × 2 block matrices with A′′1,1 = A′, B′′1,1 = B′, A′′1,2 = B′′2,1 = 1 and
A′′2,1 = A
′′
2,2 = B
′′
1,2 = B
′′
2,2 = 0. Now let (x
′′,y′′) be any 1/n′′c
′
= 1/n2c-approximate Nash
equilibrium of game G′′ = (A′′,B′′). By the definition of ǫ-approximate Nash equilibria, one
can show that 0 ≤ ∑n<i≤n′′ x′′i ,∑n<i≤n′′ y′′i ≤ n1−2c ≪ 1/2, since we assumed that c ≥ 2. Let
a =
∑
1≤i≤n x
′′
i and b =
∑
1≤i≤n y
′′
i . We construct a profile of mixed strategies (x
′,y′) of G′ as
follows: x′i = x
′′
i /a and y
′
i = y
′′
i /b for all i ∈ [1 : n]. Since a, b > 1/2, one can show that (x′,y′) is
a 2/n2c-approximate Nash equilibrium of G′, which is also a 1/nc-approximate Nash equilibrium
of the original game G.
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D Gadget Gates: Complete the Proof of Lemma 6.4
Proof for Gζ Gates. From (1), (2) and Figure 3, we have
〈
x|bS2k−1
〉− 〈x|bS2k〉 = x[v]− α, and〈
aS2k−1|y
〉− 〈aS2k|y〉 = (yC [v]− y[v]) − y[v].
If x[v] > α + ǫ, then from the first equation, we have y[v] = yC [v]. But the second equation
implies x[v] = 0, which contradicts our assumption that x[v] > 0.
If x[v] < α − ǫ, then from the first equation, we have y[v] = 0. But the second equation
implies that x[v] = xC [v] ≥ 1/K − ǫ, which contradicts the assumption that x[v] < α − ǫ and
α ≤ 1/K.
Proof for G×ζ Gates. From (1), (2) and Figure 3, we have
〈
x|bS2k−1
〉− 〈x|bS2k〉 = αx[v1]− x[v], and〈
aS2k−1|y
〉− 〈aS2k|y〉 = y[v]− (yC [v] − y[v]).
If x[v] > min(αx[v1], 1/K ) + ǫ, then x[v] > αx[v1] + ǫ, since x[v] ≤ xC [v] ≤ 1/K + ǫ. By the
first equation, we have y[v] = 0 and the second one implies that x[v] = 0, which contradicts the
assumption that x[v] > min(αx[v1], 1/K ) + ǫ > 0.
If x[v] < min(αx[v1], 1/K ) − ǫ ≤ αx[v1]− ǫ, then the first equation shows y[v] = yC [v] and
thus by the second equation, we have x[v] = xC [v] ≥ 1/K − ǫ, which contradicts the assumption
that x[v] < min(αx[v1], 1/K )− ǫ ≤ 1/K − ǫ.
Proof for G= Gates. G= is a special case of G×ζ , with parameter α = 1.
Proof for G− Gates. From (1), (2) and Figure 3, we have
〈
x|bS2k−1
〉− 〈x|bS2k〉 = x[v1]− x[v2]− x[v], and〈
aS2k−1|y
〉− 〈aS2k|y〉 = y[v]− (yC [v] − y[v]).
If x[v] > max(x[v1]−x[v2], 0)+ ǫ ≥ x[v1]−x[v2]+ ǫ, then the first equation implies y[v] = 0. By
the second equation, we have x[v] = 0 which contradicts the assumption that x[v] > max(x[v1]−
x[v2], 0) + ǫ > 0.
If x[v] < min(x[v1] − x[v2], 1/K) − ǫ ≤ x[v1] − x[v2]− ǫ, then by the first equation, we have
y[v] = yC [v]. By the second equation, we have x[v] = xC [v] ≥ 1/K − ǫ, contradicting the
assumption that x[v] < min(x[v1]− x[v2], 1/K ) − ǫ ≤ 1/K − ǫ.
Proof for G< Gates. From (1), (2) and Figure 3, we have
〈
x|bS2k−1
〉− 〈x|bS2k〉 = x[v1]− x[v2], and〈
aS2k−1|y
〉− 〈aS2k|y〉 = (yC [v]− y[v]) − y[v].
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If x[v1] < x[v2] − ǫ, then y[v] = 0 according to the first equation. By the second equation, we
have x[v] = xC [v] = 1/K ± ǫ and thus, x[v] = ǫB 1.
If x[v1] > x[v2] + ǫ, then y[v] = yC [v] according to the first equation. By the second one, we
have x[v] = 0 and thus, x[v] = ǫB 0.
Proof for G∨ Gates. From (1), (2) and Figure 3, we have
〈
x|bS2k−1
〉− 〈x|bS2k〉 = x[v1] + x[v2]− 1/(2K), and〈
aS2k−1|y
〉− 〈aS2k|y〉 = y[v]− (yC [v] − y[v]).
If x[v1] =
ǫ
B 1 or x[v2] =
ǫ
B 1, then x[v1] + x[v2] ≥ 1/K − ǫ. By the first equation y[v] = yC [v]. By
the second equation, we have x[v] = xC [v] = 1/K ± ǫ and thus, x[v] = ǫB 1.
If x[v1] =
ǫ
B 0 and x[v2] =
ǫ
B 0, then x[v1]+x[v2] ≤ 2ǫ. From the first equation, y[v] = 0. Then,
the second equation implies x[v] = ǫB 0.
Proof for G∧ Gates. From (1), (2) and Figure 3, we have
〈
x|bS2k−1
〉− 〈x|bS2k〉 = x[v1] + x[v2]− 3/(2K), and〈
aS2k−1|y
〉− 〈aS2k|y〉 = y[v]− (yC [v] − y[v]).
If x[v1] =
ǫ
B 0 or x[v2] =
ǫ
B 0, then x[v1] + x[v2] ≤ 1/K + 2ǫ. From the first equation, we have
y[v] = 0. By the second equation, we have x[v] = 0 and thus, x[v] = ǫB 0.
If x[v1] =
ǫ
B 1 and x[v2] =
ǫ
B 1, then x[v1] + x[v2] ≥ 2/K − 2ǫ. The first equation shows
y[v] = yC [v]. By the second equation, x[v] = xC [v] = 1/K ± ǫ and thus, x[v] = ǫB 1.
Proof for G¬ Gates. From (1), (2) and Figure 3, we have
〈
x|bS2k−1
〉− 〈x|bS2k〉 = x[v1]− (xC [v1]− x[v1]), and〈
aS2k−1|y
〉− 〈aS2k|y〉 = (yC [v]− y[v]) − y[v].
If x[v1] =
ǫ
B 1, then by the first equation, y[v] = yC [v]. Then, by the second equation, we have
x[v] = 0.
If x[v1] =
ǫ
B 0, then the first equation shows that y[v] = 0. By the second equation, we have
x[v] = xC [v] and thus, x[v] =
ǫ
B 1.
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